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The Role of Social Science in Judicial Decision Making: How 
Gay Rights Advocates Can Learn From Integration and Capital 
Punishment Case Law 
AMY RUBLIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the intersection of social science and judicial decision making.  
It examines to what extent, and in what contexts, judges utilize social science in reaching 
and bolstering their rulings.  The Article delves into three areas of law that are typically 
not grouped together—integration, gay rights, and capital punishment—to see the 
similarities and differences in the use of empirical findings.  Analyzing the language in 
judicial opinions from family courts, district courts, circuit courts, and the United States 
Supreme Court enabled the emergence of trends.  The opinions revealed that 
inconsistency in the use of social science may stem from how a given issue is framed, the 
tide of public opinion on an issue, and whether social science in that realm is settled.  
Application of these principles to the gay rights context suggests that if the Supreme 
Court were to hear a case on gay marriage, a national consensus on the issue would be 
more outcome determinative than settled social science. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its 
decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as 
compromises with social and political pressures.”1 
Judicial opinions are significant for their holdings, but one cannot fully 
grasp the significance of those holdings without exploring the reasoning that led 
to the conclusion.  To read the rule derived from a case and nothing more tells 
only part of the story about why a case is significant and the precedential value it 
may hold.  Just as a holding cannot be understood in isolation, a case cannot be 
understood without reference to history, the changing tides of public opinion, 
and other cases within a given field.  Judicial opinions explicate what may not be 
apparent from a holding and shed light on what evidence tipped the scales in a 
given direction.  When a court’s decision in a case has considerable ramifications 
on constitutional interpretation or ingrained societal practices, it is crucial to 
uncover what convinced the court. 
Over the past century, there has been a marked increase in the number of 
social science studies brought to the attention of courts and a correlated rise in 
the frequency with which studies are cited in judicial opinions.  “Social science” 
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 1.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
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refers to the work of people from myriad fields who utilize different methods to 
analyze and explain social phenomena and rest their explanations on a scientific 
basis.2  This scientific basis permits social scientists to “claim an ‘objective’ 
understanding of human behavior.”3  One way to obtain this objective 
understanding is through experiments or field-based data collection to test 
hypotheses.4  Both quantitative and qualitative studies fall under the social 
science umbrella, and both types appear in judicial opinions.  Citations to—and 
discussions of—surveys, polls, experiments, textual analyses, and direct 
observations by social scientists weave throughout present-day case law.  
Judicial opinions often entail different kinds of methodologies and findings, 
strongly suggesting that there are no discernible bounds on the types of social 
science courts will cite.5 
The utilization of social science demonstrates that courts go beyond strict 
application of case law to consider extra-judicial factors when making their 
decisions.  In other words, the citation of social science illustrates that judges do 
not decide a case only on the facts in front of them but instead take into account 
larger societal issues and “facts” from the world outside of law.  Judges “must 
constantly import from disciplines around the law in order to stay up-to-date”6 
because the social context in which the law is applied is not static and evolves 
over time.  Because a given case can have repercussions beyond its particular 
facts, it is important for judges to consider how the rule they adopt may 
influence society.  It is therefore imperative to examine the interplay of social 
science, the courts, and societal trends in order to discern how they influence 
each other. 
When social science is cited in judicial opinions that overturn established 
precedent or seem to satisfy public demand on a given issue,7 a number of 
questions arise.  For example, did the court cite social science to justify an 
opinion that was merely a response to public pressures?  If one believes that 
social science is only a façade for an opinion that is based upon popular will, 
what does that imply about the court’s perception of its own legitimacy and the 
public’s perception of its authority?  Does it make a difference whether a study is 
discussed in the text or only cited as a footnote?  Are there certain areas of law 
where courts are more receptive to social science research and, if so, why?  Who 
introduces social science evidence to the courts and how is it introduced?  
 
 2.  These fields may include economics, sociology, political science, psychology, and 
psychiatry.  David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as 
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1007 (1989). 
 3.  Id. at 1007–08. 
 4.  Id. at 1022. 
 5.  Limits on citations to social science may instead derive from two factors: first, from judges’ 
determinations as to whether social science is persuasive and therefore warrants either discussion or 
citation in footnotes; and second, what the parties to the litigation and amici curiae (“friends of the 
court”) present to the court through their briefs. 
 6.  Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical 
Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 118 (1997). 
 7.  These two notions are not mutually exclusive.  Many times public sentiment on a given 
issue entails a desire for reversal of discriminatory or antiquated practices condoned in precedent, 
such as overturning sodomy laws that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), found constitutional. 
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Further, issues related to the litigants and other interested parties are implicated 
when social science is employed in a judicial opinion. 
This Article endeavors to answer these questions through an examination of 
three major areas of the law where lower courts and the Supreme Court of the 
United States have shown both acceptance of and resistance to social science.  
These three realms include school integration, homosexual rights, and the death 
penalty.  The case law suggests that if a court frames an issue as a question of 
equality based on “new” understandings, it is more likely that judges will find 
social science persuasive and cite it in an opinion.  Those “new findings” tip the 
scales towards overturning precedent that may have perpetuated inequality.  For 
example, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka8 overturned segregation in public 
school education and thus overruled the “separate but equal” principle espoused 
in Plessy v. Ferguson.9  Brown may be considered the paragon case in which the 
Supreme Court found integration acceptable due to novel understandings about 
the effects of segregated schooling.  Furthermore, how a court frames the issue 
can make all the difference in ascertaining whether social science will influence 
the outcome of the case.  If the court construes the issue as one with serious 
constitutional or societal implications, social science is less likely to play a 
decisive role.  Just as Brown found social science persuasive in finding in favor of 
integration and equality, the Supreme Court rejected social science when 
contemplating racial disparities in the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp.10  By 
framing the issue in McCleskey as an Eighth Amendment constitutional issue, the 
decision of which would likely have far-reaching implications for the criminal 
justice system, the Court could exercise constitutional avoidance11 and thus 
refuse to recognize the potential merits of social science studies.12  It appears that 
the Court feared accepting social science in a case that could have applicability 
beyond the facts of the particular case.13  Hence, how a court perceives the 
question before it can determine whether there will be favorable reception to 
extra-judicial factors generally and social science specifically. 
Another element that plays a role in determining whether a court will be 
willing to take notice of empirical analyses is whether such findings are treated 
as legislative fact, adjudicative fact, or as a social framework.14  When social 
science is used to make law, it is known as legislative fact.15  Kenneth Culp Davis 
 
 8.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 9.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 11.  “The Supreme Court’s use of the canon of constitutional avoidance pre-dates the substantive 
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison.”  Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, 
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1554 (2000). 
 12.  The Supreme Court framed the issue thusly: “This case presents the question whether a 
complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing 
determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey’s capital sentence is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282–83. 
 13.  “McCleskey’s claim that these statistics [from the Baldus study] are sufficient proof of 
discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, would extend to all capital cases in 
Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant is black.”  Id. at 293. 
 14.  These three categories will be explored further infra. 
 15.  See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942). 
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defined the term “legislative fact,” and he explicates: 
When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively; the 
courts have created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts 
which inform the tribunal’s legislative judgment are called legislative facts . . . 
Legislative facts are those which help the tribunal to determine the content of 
law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what 
course of action to take.  Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not 
concern the immediate parties.16 
Hence, when a court utilizes legislative facts it is creating precedent and 
“arriv[ing] at new rules of law of general applicability.”17 
In the realms of school integration, homosexual rights, and the death 
penalty, the Supreme Court’s rulings have significant and far-reaching 
ramifications.  Rulings in these three areas, based upon legislative facts, may 
very likely have ramifications far beyond the instant cases and may shape other 
areas of law.  Through legislative facts, judges assume the role of legislators.  
This is distinguishable from adjudicative facts, which concern the instant parties 
and often fall within the province of the jury.18  Thus, in school integration, 
homosexual rights, and death penalty cases, when legislative facts are used to 
develop a new rule of law, the Court must tread carefully because its espousal of 
a certain position may very likely reverberate beyond the particular case. 
For example, if the Court were to hear a case about homosexual partners’ 
right to marry and parental rights, and amicus curiae briefs were filed containing 
studies on the psychological effects on children of having unmarried homosexual 
parents—as they have been in lower court cases such as Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health in Massachusetts19—a decision based on those studies as 
legislative facts would be akin to judicial notice of those studies, meaning that 
the legislative facts would be considered undisputed and notorious.  This would 
in turn have implications beyond family law because such studies would be 
tantamount to undisputed facts that could form the basis of opinions in other 
areas. 
When contemplating whether to treat extra-judicial factors as legislative 
facts, it is likely that the Supreme Court will shy away from legislative facts 
unless the Court perceives the American people are receptive to or want a 
particular change.  To make that determination, the Court may consider national 
mood or public opinion.  This Article argues that the Court valuates the public’s 
pulse before deciding whether to grant certiorari and then continues to weigh 
public sentiment to arrive at an outcome and support that result.  For example, in 
Atkins v. Virginia,20 the Court found that the Eighth Amendment precludes the 
execution of a mentally retarded defendant convicted of a capital offense.21  In 
 
 16.  Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 952 (1955). 
 17.  Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 
U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 197 (2000), available at http://faculty.law.lsu.edu/toddbruno/ 
Brandeis%20Briefing.pdf. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 20.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 21.  Id. at 321. 
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support of its conclusion, the Court stated that a national consensus opposed 
imposition of the death penalty on this class of defendants.22  This case suggests 
that the Court’s willingness to effectuate change in an area it labels as 
constitutional is contingent upon a broad national consensus or notions of the 
necessity of protecting certain segments of society.23  Overall, the Supreme Court 
is likely to gauge the demand for and imperativeness of a significant change in 
the law before accepting legislative facts. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part II explores the meaning of the terms 
“legislative fact,” “adjudicative fact,” and “social frameworks.”  These 
paradigms explain how social science has been used by courts to make law, to 
decide the instant case, or to construct a context in which to understand the issue 
between the present litigants.  Part III describes the case—and footnote—most 
cited for the notion that judges employ social science when deciding cases: Brown 
v. Board of Education of Topeka.  This Part also discusses the reasoning in other 
school integration cases, such as Grutter v. Bollinger,24 and the amicus briefs filed 
in those cases that focused the Supreme Court’s attention on the scientific merits 
of affirmative action.  Part IV focuses on Lawrence v. Texas25 and the arguments 
made for homosexual parents’ rights by amici curiae in lower court cases.  
Although it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will ultimately grant certiorari 
in these cases, it seems apparent that the number of amicus briefs—and, thus, 
social science—submitted to the Court will likely eclipse the number submitted 
to courts below.  Next, Part V analyzes the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  In particular, this Part considers why the Court rejected social 
science in McKleskey v. Kemp26 but cited survey data as persuasive in Atkins v. 
Virginia.27  Part VI pulls these threads together and assesses the interaction of 
settled social science and widespread movement in favor of rights or a particular 
law.  This Part discusses how social science research can determine whether 
there is a national consensus and how the Supreme Court responds to such a 
national consensus.  Part VII briefly concludes. 
II. LEGISLATIVE FACT, ADJUDICATIVE FACT, AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORKS 
A. History of Social Science in the Courts: From a Formalist to Realist Court 
Prior to the 1920s, legal formalism was the dominant paradigm in American 
courts.  Legal formalism stressed judicial interpretations of the law and did not 
perceive extra-judicial fact-finding as sound.28  In the 1920s and 1930s, the legal 
realist movement shifted to supplant the formalists’ narrow reliance on 
precedent.  The legal realists argued that social context and psychology matter 
 
 22.  Id. at 316, n.21. 
 23.  The law has treated children and the mentally handicapped in a protective fashion. 
 24.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 25.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 26.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 27.  Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
 28.  Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective 
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100 n.38 (1993). 
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and should play a role in judicial decisions.29  According to the realists, 
consideration of these factors was imperative to achieve sound social policy.30  
Members of this realist movement “were united by a belief that judges devoted 
too much attention to the language of prior cases and too little to understanding 
the social reality behind their own decisions.”31  This school had support both 
from outside and inside the judiciary.  Psychologists such as Sigmund Freud, 
John Watson, and Hugo von Munsterberg asserted that psychology could be 
applied to issues of law facing courts, and Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis 
Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo all saw the benefits of using social science when 
making judicial decisions.32 
The submission of Louis Brandeis’ brief for the defendant in error in Muller 
v. Oregon in 1908 marked a shift from formalism to realism.33  In his brief, which 
came to be known as the “Brandeis Brief,” only three pages grappled with 
precedent34 and the remaining one hundred pages presented the Supreme Court 
with social science evidence on the issue of whether a state was constitutionally 
permitted to regulate women’s working hours even though it was unable to 
regulate men’s working hours.35  The Court noted the uniqueness of Brandeis’ 
brief, stating: “It may not be amiss, in the present case, before examining the 
constitutional question, to notice the course of legislation, as well as expressions 
of opinion from other than judicial sources.  In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. 
Brandeis for the defendant in error is a very copious collection of all these 
matters.”36  In so doing, the Court acknowledged the role of extra-judicial factors.  
This sent a message to courts and advocates that issues outside the scope of 
precedent could (and would) be considered; both the brief and the Court’s 
recognition of its utility signaled a shift away from legal formalism.  With 
Brandeis’ ascension to the Supreme Court in 1916, the legal realists gathered 
momentum. 
In 1937, the realists finally displaced the formalists when the New Deal 
Court began to cite social science studies in its opinions.37  Due to the number of 
social programs enacted at this time in American history, the Court needed to 
look beyond precedent and recognize the programs’ focus on social justice.  At a 
time of new programs and the Depression, one could reasonably conclude the 
Court lacked precedent that would provide clear guidance for resolving such 
 
 29.  Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from 
Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. R. 567, 611 (1999); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 101 
n.39. 
 30.  See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–
27 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW]. 
 31.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 101. 
 32.  Rebman, supra note 29, at 611. 
 33.  See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  According to John Monahan and Laurens Walker, 
“Brandeis’ brief in Muller v. Oregon initiated the use of social science materials in American courts.”  
MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 8. 
 34.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 106 n.61. 
 35.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 628 
(1985). 
 36.  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). 
 37.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 28, at 108–09. 
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issues as social security and unemployment compensation.38  The Court, along 
with New Dealers and realists, “discounted the worth of many traditional values 
and expressed a preference for pragmatic experimentation.”39 
The Court obtained social science through amicus curiae (“friend of the 
court”) briefs.40  These briefs intend to aid the Court’s arrival at a just conclusion, 
although these briefs are not neutral and often urge justices to favor one side.41  
In the wake of the significant changes in 1937, groups began to file amicus curiae 
briefs with frequency; now “amicus briefs are filed in almost every case the 
Court accepts for review.”42 
Social science evidence, regardless of how it is provided to the court, is 
important in how it is used once it comes to the court’s attention..  There are 
three key ways in which social science is employed—as legislative fact, 
adjudicative fact, and social framework.  How a court, particularly the Supreme 
Court, utilizes social science depends on the breadth of the rule it wishes to craft.  
With awareness of these uses, one may see patterns across myriad areas of law. 
B. Legislative and Adjudicative Facts 
Kenneth Culp Davis, in a foundational work published in the Harvard Law 
Review in 1942, coined the terms “legislative facts” and “adjudicative facts.”43  
“Legislative facts” are those that inform the judgment of an agency or court that 
is “wrestl[ing] with a question of law or policy.”44  When judges create “the 
common law through judicial legislation,” they use legislative facts.45  Legislative 
facts encompass more than the “social and economic data which go into the 
determination of fundamental policies.”46  Conversely, “[w]hen an agency [or 
court] finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what the 
circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the agency [or 
court] is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may conveniently be 
called adjudicative facts.”47  While legislative facts may pertain to a variety of 
cases, adjudicative facts concern questions only relevant to the parties before the 
court.48  Simply, arguments that a law should be changed are likely to employ 
legislative facts, whereas arguments about the events in a particular case are 
more likely rooted in adjudicative facts. 
The type of fact at issue may inform whether a court finds a trial to be in the 
 
 38.  See ALFRED C. AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 161 n.33 (1992). 
 39.  MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 16. 
 40.  “The lobbying device available for use before the Court is the brief amicus.”  Fowler V. 
Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1953). 
 41.  Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation 
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (2004). 
 42.  Id. at 807–08. 
 43.  Culp Davis, supra note 15. 
 44.  Id. at 402. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 407. 
 47.  Id. at 402. 
 48.  Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting U.S. v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 
531 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
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best interests of the parties.  For example, trials are preferable when adjudicative 
facts are at issue; trials are less useful when legislative facts or broad factual 
scenarios are involved.49  As Davis stated in an administrative law treatise, 
“[f]acts that concern scientific truths, sociological data, and industry-wide 
practices . . . are not peculiarly within the knowledge of the parties and are not of 
the type that generally would be aided by viewing the demeanor of witnesses, by 
cross-examination, and other aspects of adversarial factual 
development.”50  These principles impact which areas of law are treated as 
adjudicative or legislative facts.  Trademarks, obscenity, and damages cases are 
more likely to be decided on the grounds of adjudicative facts and the particular 
circumstances of the parties.51  By contrast, in cases involving the First, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, social science is used as legislative fact to 
make law.52  In those constitutional cases, the focus is on the case at hand, but 
there is also an eye to the significance of the constitutional interpretation (and 
particularly so when the court rendering the decision is the Supreme Court).  
This is because “[w]hen the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that 
judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used 
procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court.”53  
Federal appellate courts have embraced the distinction between legislative and 
adjudicative facts,54 thus solidifying the difference in approaches between 
constitutional cases and policy-making on the one hand and fact-based cases and 
a more limited number of interested litigants on the other. 
Examples illuminate the contours of these concepts.  In Processed Plastic Co. 
v. Warner Communications, Inc.,55 the Seventh Circuit treated social science as 
adjudicative fact.56  At issue was whether Processed Plastic Company (“PPC”) 
violated the Lanham Act by manufacturing a toy car that resembled a car used in 
the “Dukes of Hazzard” television series, a registered copyright of Warner 
Brothers.57  To show that there was consumer confusion, “Warner Bros. 
introduced a survey of children between the ages of six to twelve in which 82% 
of the children identified a toy car identical to PPC’s Maverick Rebel as the 
‘Dukes of Hazzard’ car and of that number 56% of them believed it was 
sponsored or authorized by the ‘Dukes of Hazzard’ television program.”58  
Although on appeal PPC challenged the utility of the survey for demonstrating 
consumer confusion given that the survey only gauged responses from a limited 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1358 (quoting K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 12:4, 15:3) (1976)). 
 51.  MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 104. 
 52.  Id. at 192.  The concept of legislative facts also pertains to whether to employ balancing tests, 
use strict scrutiny, ascertain what rises to the level of an establishment of religion, and whether a jury 
comprised of six people functions in a way comparable to a jury comprised of twelve people.  John O. 
McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 75 (2008). 
 53. The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Dec.26, 2011). 
 54.  Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d  1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 55.  Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 854. 
 58.  Id. at 854–55. 
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age bracket of the population, children six to twelve years old, the Circuit Court 
found that the lower court did not clearly err in finding the survey results 
probative on the question of consumer confusion.59  This case demonstrates how 
social science—here the use of survey evidence—can be used to decide a dispute. 
In United States v. Leon,60 social science was treated as legislative fact.61  In 
that case, the issue facing the Supreme Court was whether the exclusionary rule 
of the Fourth Amendment “should be modified so as not to bar the use in the 
prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but 
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”62  In an extensive 
footnote, the Court considered studies evaluating the impact of the exclusionary 
rule on the disposition of felony arrests.63  In another footnote, the Court cited 
recent studies on the cost of the exclusionary rule in order to show that the 
Court’s past findings on the rule’s costs were exaggerated.64  Interestingly, the 
Court also cited an absence of social science in support of the notion that the rule 
may not have a deterrent effect on law enforcement: 
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any 
deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable 
belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  ‘No empirical 
researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with 
any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect.’65 
What differentiates Leon from Processed Plastic Co. is the particular use of social 
science.  Whereas the Court in Leon used social science as legislative fact “to 
make policy determinations with respect to existing law based on more general 
findings,”66 in Processed Plastic the Seventh Circuit relied on survey evidence as 
adjudicative fact to decide whether there was a Lanham Act violation in that 
particular case.67  Thus, these two cases illustrate the differences in the courts’ 
use of social science in the context of legislative versus adjudicative facts. 
C. Social Frameworks 
Another paradigm—social frameworks—has joined the ranks of Davis’s 
legislative and adjudicative facts in describing how courts utilize social science.  
Coined by Laurens Walker and John Monahan in a 1987 article, the term 
combines the uses of both adjudicative and legislative facts.  Walker and 
Monahan state: “[E]mpirical information is being offered that incorporates 
aspects of both of the traditional uses: general research results are used to 
 
 59.  Id. at 857. 
 60.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 900. 
 63.  Id. at 907 n.6. 
 64.  Id. at 913 n.11. 
 65.  Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (2007)). 
 66.  Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, Social Framework Analysis as Inadmissible “Character” 
Evidence, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2008). 
 67.  Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854–58 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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construct a frame of reference or background context for deciding factual issues 
crucial to the resolution of a specific case.”68  Walker and Monahan observed 
that, in cases of sexual victimization, battered women, eyewitness identification, 
and assessments of dangerousness, social science was used in a way that 
diverged from the traditional legislative-adjudicative fact framework.69  In these 
cases, social science research reflected legislative facts; the studies “bore on 
issues at trial only as those issues were particular instances of larger empirical 
relationships that had been uncovered.”70  As in instances of adjudicative facts, 
however, studies in these cases “were introduced solely to help resolve specific 
factual issues disputed by the immediate parties to the case, issues whose 
resolution had no substantive significance beyond the case at hand.”71  In the 
same way that adjudicative facts are introduced, social science in social 
frameworks comes before a court through expert testimony.72  Social frameworks 
help lay the groundwork for the decision of specific factual issues in a given case. 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.73 helps shed light on the use of a social 
framework.  In that case, six plaintiffs brought sex discrimination claims under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought certification of a nationwide 
class of women who experienced Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimination in pay and 
promotion policies from December 26, 1998, to the time of the suit years later.74  
To establish the commonality requirement of Rule 23 (which prescribes what 
elements must exist for class certification), the plaintiffs presented evidence from 
sociologist Dr. William Bielby.75  Dr. Bielby interpreted and explained facts 
indicating that Wal-Mart’s culture likely included gender stereotypes.76  He did 
so by examining items ranging from deposition testimony of Wal-Mart managers 
to “correspondence, memos, reports, and presentations relating to personnel 
policy and practice” to “a large body of social science research on the impact of 
organizational policy and practice on workplace bias.”77 
According to Dr. Bielby, he used a social framework analysis to uncover 
unique aspects of Wal-Mart’s practices and policies; he concluded that these 
practices and policies likely made decisions on issues of pay and promotion 
susceptible to gender bias.78  The district court found, and the Ninth Circuit 
 
 68.  Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 
VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987). 
 69.  Id. at 563. 
 70.  Id. at 569. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 583.  According to Walker and Monahan, this method of introducing social science 
entails two major problems.  It is inefficient and expensive.  In terms of inefficiency, “[t]he same 
testimony about the same research studies must be heard in case after case, whenever a framework 
for a given type of factual determination is sought.”  As for cost, because “[t]he pool of expert 
witnesses is limited to a small group of basic researchers in each topical area and these researchers 
must be transported and paid to repeat their testimony in each new case,” the introduction of a 
framework may be precluded by financial considerations.  Id. at 583–84. 
 73.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 74.  Id. at 577. 
 75.  Id. at 601. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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agreed, that Dr. Bielby’s analysis could be used to satisfy the commonality 
requirement; demonstrating consistency with other courts, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “courts have long accepted . . . that properly analyzed social science 
data, like that offered by Dr. Bielby, may support a plaintiff’s assertions that a 
claim is proper for class resolution.”79  By considering larger issues such as bias 
in the workplace, this expert endeavored to solve the specific factual issue facing 
these parties, thus demonstrating the utility of social frameworks. 
The history of social science in law reveals both growing acceptance and 
increasing use in myriad ways.  A court’s treatment of social science depends not 
only on the issue before the court but also whether the court intends to craft a 
broadly applicable rule or narrowly decide the instant case.  Judges may bring 
social science into a case to support a given decision or line of reasoning; parties 
often introduce social science to lend credibility to their arguments and cast 
doubt on those of their opponents. 
The three areas of law at the heart of this Article—school segregation, 
homosexual rights, and the death penalty—make plain that the Supreme Court’s 
approach to social science may vary even within a given area of law.  By 
examining the jurisprudence, inferences can be made about whether judicial 
opinions cite social science as a way to legitimize their responsiveness to the 
thrust of popular opinion.  The following Parts look to what drives the Court and 
how that motivation molds how social science is (or is not) employed in an 
opinion.  The next Part, in its discussion of integration cases, illustrates that social 
science may be employed to demonstrate new understandings and challenge 
prior, antiquated decisions. 
III. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOOTNOTE 11 AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka footnote 1180 is considered to be the 
paragon of judicial acceptance of social science.81  In the momentous case of 
Brown, the Supreme Court considered whether to overturn the “separate but 
equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson82 in the context of public education.83  The 
Court consolidated cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware to 
consider the common legal question of whether segregation in the public schools 
deprived the plaintiffs of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.84  In Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, the Court stressed 
three key factors influencing its decision: “the Court’s inability to discern the 
intended historical scope of the Fourteenth Amendment; the development of 
public education since the adoption of the Amendment; and the harmful social 
 
 79.  Id. at 602. 
 80.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 81.  John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social 
Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1720–21 (2008) (stating, “Judicial acceptance of social science 
research as a form a legislative fact was most famously embodied in Brown v. Board of Education”). 
 82.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (stating that the problem with Homer Plessy’s 
argument is “the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority”). 
 83.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 84.  Id. at 487. 
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and psychological impact of racial segregation on black schoolchildren.”85  On 
the first issue, the Court found little in the Amendment’s history regarding its 
intended impact on public education.86  With regard to the importance of public 
education, the Court asserted that education is a crucial means through which 
children learn cultural values, prepare for future professional training, and 
adjust to life in a given society.87  As such, an opportunity to obtain an education 
from the state “is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”88  
The Court therefore held that “segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors 
[are] . . . equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities.”89 
Unlike in Plessy v. Ferguson90 where the Court found that separation does 
not connote inferiority, the Brown Court stated that separating children on the 
basis of race instills “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”91  
The Court bolstered this assertion with “psychological knowledge” that was 
unavailable at the time of the Plessy decision; the court articulated this 
“knowledge” in the famous footnote 11.92  In that footnote, Chief Justice Warren 
listed seven sociological and psychological studies that purported to establish 
that racial segregation adversely affected black children.93  Following the 
decision, the “conventional narrative” that the Brown outcome was based on 
social science took root.94 
Footnote 11 was put to the test nearly a decade later in the Georgia case of 
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education95 where a class of black 
students brought an action to enjoin the Board of Education in Savannah-
Chatham County from operating an integrated school system.96  These plaintiffs 
argued that “admission to the various public schools of Savannah-Chatham 
County is determined solely upon the basis of race and color and that plaintiffs 
are irreparably injured thereby.”97  On the side of the defendant school board, 
some white students joined the suit as intervenors, arguing that the separation of 
races in public schools was not based solely on race but was instead based upon 
“racial traits of educational significance as to which racial identity was only a 
 
 85.  Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme 
Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 796 (2002). 
 86.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 490. 
 87.  Id. at 493. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 91.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 92.  Id. at 494–95. 
 93.  Id. at 494 n.11. 
 94.  Mody, supra note 85, at 803. 
 95.  Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev’d, 333 
F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 96.  Id. at 667. 
 97.  Id. 
Rublin_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:40 AM 
 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING  191 
convenient index.”98  The defendants argued that educational opportunities 
would be hampered and psychological harm would result if students of different 
races were mixed in a given class.99 
At trial, the defendants called numerous established social scientists to 
testify, including Dr. Ernest van den Haag, a lecturer on sociology and social 
philosophy at the New School for Social Research,100 Dr. R. T. Osborne, Professor 
of Psychology at the University of Georgia,101 and Dr. Henry E. Garrett, Emeritus 
Professor of Psychology at Columbia University.102  These authorities produced 
evidence on the issues of group identification, test results, and learning rates 
between white and black children; the white children outpaced the black 
children in each of these areas.103  The plaintiffs did not contest the credentials 
and knowledge of these witnesses.104 
The district court then faced the plaintiffs’ argument that “segregation itself 
injures negro children in the school system” and therefore tried to ascertain the 
bounds of the Brown decision.105  The instant court determined that the question 
at the heart of Brown—whether segregation on the basis of race deprives black 
schoolchildren of equal educational opportunities—was a question of fact rather 
than law.106  The court found the studies cited by the Supreme Court in footnote 
11 less persuasive than the evidence presented in the Stell case.107  In the words of 
the Southern District of Georgia District Court: “The Court accordingly accepts 
the evidence given in the present case as having somewhat stronger indicia of 
truth than that on which the findings of potential injury were made in Brown.”108  
As a result, the court perceived Brown as inapplicable to the case and dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ complaint. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held 
that Brown was not limited to the particular facts of that case.109  Due to 
principles undergirding the federal court system, lower district courts are bound 
by Supreme Court opinions whether or not such courts think that the Supreme 
Court made an erroneous decision on issues of fact or law.  The broad rule 
derived from Brown is that “separate but equal schools for the races were 
inherently unequal;”110 the lower court should have followed that rule, 
regardless of what it perceived to be persuasive contrary evidence. 
In this way, the Fifth Circuit established that the conclusion of Brown, 
supported by footnote 11, was controlling.  Social science was used to make law 
in footnote 11, thus illustrating how legislative facts influence judicial decision 
 
 98.  Id. at 668. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 673. 
 101.  Id. at 668. 
 102.  Id. at 672. 
 103.  Id. at 669–76. 
 104.  Id. at 676. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 677–78. 
 107.  Id. at 679–80. 
 108.  Id. at 680. 
 109.  Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 110.  Id. at 61. 
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making.  Findings of fact are not treated as precedent, whereas findings of law 
have a stare decisis effect on other courts.  Hence, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
strongly suggests that, when a legal conclusion based on social science (or 
finding its support in social science) is meant to bind other courts,  the 
underlying social science ascends to a level of importance on par with precedent.  
In other words, the cited studies “become de facto conclusions of law which are 
not disputable.”111  It is as if the string of social science studies is on par with a 
string of case law on a given issue. 
The Court’s citation of studies in footnote 11 had two major effects.  First, it 
sent a message to future litigants and amici curiae that social science can be used 
to provide credibility to a suggested conclusion of law.  As a result, it may be in a 
litigant’s best interest to show scientific support for a given claim as a means of 
enhancing the claim’s credibility.  The second effect, particularly in light of the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Stell, is that a question of fact, supported by social 
science, may be recast as a question of law and therefore become unassailable.  
Therefore, when the Supreme Court adopts a rule of law based on empirical 
support and that rule assumes the force of precedent, the Court must consider 
the implications of that rule for future cases. 
In the area of race and education, and in particular affirmative action, social 
science continues to factor into decisions.  Amici play a crucial role in presenting 
social science to courts.  A pair of cases regarding affirmative action—Grutter v. 
Bollinger112 and Gratz v. Bollinger113—illustrate the role of amici in presenting 
judges with evidence and how that social science forms the bedrock of decisions 
in this area. In Grutter, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of 
whether the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race in its admissions 
process was unlawful.114  A white Michigan resident challenged the law school’s 
policy, arguing that she was denied admission because the policy favored 
applicants from other racial groups.115  Respondent Law School asserted that 
considering race as a factor in admissions decisions furthered the goal of 
maintaining a diverse student body, which in turn has educational benefits for 
students.116  The Supreme Court found it important to defer to the Law School’s 
judgment that racial diversity “is essential to its educational mission.”117  Hence, 
the use of race in admissions decisions did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.118 
Amici supported the notion that diversity can translate into educational 
gains.  The Supreme Court stated: “In addition to the expert studies and reports 
entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body 
diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
 
 111.  Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham As 
An Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 667 (1984). 
 112.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 113.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 114.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311. 
 115.  Id. at 316–317. 
 116.  Id. at 327–28. 
 117.  Id. at 328. 
 118.  Id. at 343. 
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increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.’ “119  The Court proceeded to describe the societal benefits derived 
from diversity, particularly at a top law school like the University of Michigan.120  
Diversity was a favorable byproduct of the government’s aims to ensure public 
institutions are available to all.  To support the notion that variance among 
students was beneficial, the Court cited briefs from amici such as General 
Motors, the United States, and the Association of American Law Schools.121  This 
is just a microcosm of the 107 briefs filed in Grutter and Gratz.122  Other 
organizations who filed briefs in these affirmative action cases included the 
American Psychological Association, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the 
American Sociological Association, the American Educational Research 
Association, and the Anti-Defamation League.123  In Grutter, the Court’s citation 
of amicus briefs suggests that those briefs had a strong influence on the outcome 
of the case.  As in Brown footnote 11, social science was the basis of a decision 
that helped define the contours of Equal Protection in the context of race and 
education.  It is apparent that social science was used to bolster a finding of 
legislative fact.  In the area of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Brown, 
Stell, and Grutter demonstrate that social science plays a significant role in 
judicial opinions.  In addition, amici have, since Brown footnote 11, increasingly 
proffered studies and evidence to influence the Court’s decision making.  The 
question remains, however, whether the Court’s decision would have changed in 
the absence of the social science.  Stated differently: was the social science in 
these cases used merely to legitimize views stemming from other sources, such 
as a justice’s perception that “separate but equal” was antiquated, or did the 
social science influence the Justices’ decision making? As explored in depth infra, 
this is an inquiry that recurs in other areas of law as well, such as homosexual 
rights and capital punishment.  
 
 119.  Id. at 330 (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research Association, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003) (No. 02-516)). 
 120.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at. at 330–33. 
 121.  Id.; Brief of General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241); Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
 122.  Gratz was closely related to Grutter.  At issue in Gratz was also affirmative action at the 
University of Michigan.  The Court, in a 6–3 decision, “rejected a formalistic point-system plan used 
by the University of Michigan to admit undergraduates.”  An Ode to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: The 
Supreme Court Approves The Consideration of Race as a Factor in Admissions by Public Institutions of Higher 
Education, DUKE L. PROGRAM PUB. L. SUP. CT. ONLINE COMMENT., http://www.law.duke.edu/ 
publiclaw/supremecourtonline/commentary/gravbol.html (last visited  Dec. 26, 2011). 
 123.  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Brief of the American Psychological 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 
and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Amicus Brief of Center for Equal Opportunity, Grutter, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of the American Sociological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of the American 
Educational Research Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of the Anti-Defamation League in Support of Neither Party, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
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 IV. THE TRAJECTORY OF GAY RIGHTS AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas124 is considered by many 
in the homosexual community to be “our Brown.”125  In other words, Lawrence is 
a landmark decision that “would usher in a civil rights revolution for gay men 
and lesbians in a fashion equivalent to the civil rights movement inaugurated by 
Brown.”126  Both Lawrence and Brown fall under the umbrella of Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.  Lawrence, like Brown, 
reversed a case that was found to sanction unfairness and hold a group back in 
the public sphere.  As mentioned above, Brown overturned the “separate but 
equal” principle enshrined in Plessy v. Ferguson.127  Lawrence overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick,128 a 1986 case holding that the right to privacy did not extend to 
private, consensual homosexual sex.129  The reasoning in both Lawrence and 
Brown included discussions of changed understandings over the years from the 
time of Bowers and Plessy, respectively.  Also like Brown, Lawrence opened the 
door to other legal challenges in the quest for equality, such as gay marriage130 
and parental rights.131  These cases are also similar in their reference to, and 
reliance upon, extrajudicial factors.  In Brown footnote 11, the Court listed seven 
studies that supported its conclusion;132 the Court in Lawrence based its decision 
on three amici curiae briefs—those filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the Cato Institute, and an alliance of history professors—by citing the briefs 
throughout the majority opinion.133 
In Lawrence, the Court had to determine “the validity of a Texas statute 
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate 
sexual conduct.”134  In that case, police in Houston, Texas, responded to a report 
of unlicensed weapons in the home of John Geddes Lawrence.  Upon entering his 
apartment, the officers witnessed Lawrence engaged in sexual activity with a 
man.  The men were arrested and charged under a Texas statute criminalizing 
“deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”135  The 
Supreme Court, in the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, first 
 
 124.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 125.  Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 
237 (2006). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See supra text accompanying notes 80–94. 
 128.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 129.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 130.  For example, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), “was the 
first unqualified court victory in a marriage equality case, and it catipulted [sic] the battle for 
marriage equality and LGBT civil rights forward.”  Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 
LAMBDA LEGAL,  http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/goodridge-v-department-of-public-
health.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
 131.  In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (finding a second parent 
adoption by females in a same-sex relationship was in the best interest of the children). 
 132.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 133.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568, 570, 572. 
 134.  Id. at 562. 
 135.  Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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explored the principles underlying the Bowers decision—Lawrence’s 
predecessor.136  Supported by amicus briefs, the Court refuted the historical 
perception upon which Bowers relied: “In academic writings, and in many of the 
scholarly amicus briefs filed to assist the Court in this case, there are 
fundamental criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the majority and 
concurring opinions in Bowers.”137  The Court discussed four factors before 
arriving at its conclusion: 1) relevant history,138 2) a case decided in the European 
Court of Human Rights,139 3) cases decided by the Supreme Court in the wake of 
Bowers that cast doubt on its foundation,140 and 4) criticisms of the decision in the 
United States.141  After exploring these issues, the Lawrence Court overruled 
Bowers142 and found that the Texas law violated the principle of equal protection 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although Lawrence does not contain a single crystallization of the ideas 
being expressed—such as footnote 11 in Brown—its  citation of amicus briefs 
demonstrates the Court’s willingness to look beyond precedent and the facts of 
the instant case.  The information proffered by amici143 bolstered the Court’s 
discussion of history, which was a key component in the decision that Bowers 
could—and should—be overruled.  By casting the discussion in terms of a 
misunderstanding of history, the Court avoided delving into social science, in 
particular the issues in the American Psychological Association et al. (“APA”) 
amicus brief about the scientific “finding” that homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder and the fitness of homosexuals to be parents.144  It could be that the 
Court simply accepted the idea that homosexuality is not a disorder and did not 
want to, in the case of parental fitness, widen the opinion to explore potential 
social issues likely to flow from the decision.  Hence, although the Court crafted 
a broad rule about equal protection, it limited its discussion to correcting 
historical errors. 
Following the Lawrence decision and its advocacy of equal protection 
regardless of sexual orientation, challenges came to lower courts on the issues of 
gay parenting and gay marriage and employed social science to a significant 
degree.  For example, in the case In re Adoption of Caitlin,145 the Family Court of 
New York, Monroe County, was faced with “petitions for second parent 
 
 136.  Id. at 567–72. 
 137.  Id. at 567–68. 
 138.  Id. at 567–72. 
 139.  Id. at 573. 
 140.  Id. at 573–75. 
 141.  Id. at 576. 
 142.  “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to 
remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”  Id. at 578. 
 143.  Thirty-three amicus briefs were filed.  For a list of the amicus briefs, see Docket for 02-102, 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,  http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/ 
docketfiles/02-102.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
 144.  Brief for American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, National 
Association of Social Workers, and Texas Chapter of The National Association of Social Workers as 
Amici Curiae supporting Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 
http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/lawrence.pdf. 
 145.  In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994). 
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adoptions by the lesbian life partners of biological mothers.”146  In the two cases 
at issue, both couples were in long-term committed relationships and 
reproduced using artificial insemination.147  The court began its analysis by 
recognizing that most state laws do not explicitly speak to same sex adoptions, 
only two states expressly bar such adoptions, and lower courts in twelve states 
have sanctioned such adoptions.148  Using the best interests of the child standard, 
courts in both New York—Matter of Evan149—and Vermont—Adoptions of B.L.V.B. 
& E.L.V.B.150— found that adoption by same-sex couples was in a child’s best 
interests and in line with public policy.151  In light of those cases, the New York 
court in the instant case redefined the issue from whether “it is in the best 
interest of children to have two mothers, as opposed to a single mother or a 
mother and a father” to “whether, given the realities of the relationships between 
the children and the petitioners and between the petitioners and the biological 
mothers, would the children herein be better or worse off if the adoptions were 
approved?”152 
Children, through adoption, acquire numerous rights, such as the right of 
parental visitation should the parents decide to separate.  Despite the 
advantages, there could be negative impacts of being raised by a same-sex 
couple.  The court determined that this argument—that any advantages could be 
outweighed by drawbacks—was moot, in light of the numerous studies finding 
that upbringing by homosexual parents had no adverse effect on children.153  To 
support this decision, the court cited research disproving the notion that 
upbringing by homosexual parents will cause their children to grow up 
homosexual.154  The court referenced cases in New York, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts that also cited these studies, which uniformly showed that sexual 
orientation occurs randomly and is no more likely to occur among children 
raised by homosexual parents.155  The court also noted studies that showed 
children who come from homosexual households are not ridiculed with greater 
frequency than children from other types of households.156  In conclusion, the 
court granted the adoptions “because it was in the children’s best interests to do 
so.” The court also noted that it was less concerned for the welfare of these 
adoptive children than for many of the children of heterosexual parents who find 
themselves before the court.157 
 
 146.  Id. at 836. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 838. 
 149.  In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844 (N. Y. Surr. Ct., 1992). 
 150.  Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). 
 151.  In re Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 838–39. 
 152.  Id. at 839. 
 153.  Id. at 840–41. 
 154.  Id. at 840 (citing Courtney R. Baggett, Sexual Orientation: Should it Affect Child Custody 
Rulings, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 189 (1992); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 
CHILD DEV.  J. 1025, 1025 (1992)). 
 155.  Id. (discussing the studies in: In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844 (N.Y. Surr. Ct., 1992); Conkel v. 
Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980)). 
 156.  Id. at 841. 
 157.  Id. 
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The In re Adoption of Caitlin158 decision evidences a trend throughout child 
custody cases involving homosexual parents: citations to social science.  By citing 
other court cases that discuss social science,159 the Family Court of New York 
validated the findings that children of homosexual couples are not 
disadvantaged in any way by the sexual orientation of their parents.  The court 
also aligned itself with the Brown footnote 11 precedent of looking to 
extrajudicial factors to reach a decision impacting equal rights.  In re Adoption of 
Caitlin is therefore representative of the custody realm specifically and the post-
Lawrence legal landscape generally. 
Empirical evidence published the same year as In re Adoption of Caitlin 
supports the notion that parents’ homosexuality does not hinder their children.  
In a 1994 article, Patricia J. Falk “identified all available legal opinions involving 
gay individuals in four substantive areas—child custody and visitation (CC), 
employment discrimination (ED), first amendment (FA), and criminal sodomy 
(CD).”160  Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, Falk made two key 
findings: first, “one-third of the studied gay rights cases contained one or more 
citations or references to social science,”161 and second, “the use of social science 
in legal opinions involving gay individuals did not vary significantly in terms of 
the substantive area.  Thus, the relatively high rate of citation was maintained 
across case contexts.”162  This study bolsters the notion that, in custody cases 
involving two homosexual parents, the reasoning of In re Adoption of Caitlin is not 
anomalous. 
Studies of children with homosexual parents have relevance beyond the 
custody context.  Cases about gay marriage also include discussions about the 
impact of marriage (or lack of marriage) on the children of same-sex couples.  For 
example, in the seminal gay marriage case Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,163 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that a state law 
limiting marriage to a man and a woman violated the state constitution’s 
equality provision.164  In so deciding, the four member majority cited studies 
demonstrating that households with same-sex parents did not disadvantage or 
adversely affect children165 and asserted that denying these parents the right to 
marry may indeed have a negative impact on those children.166  In this way, the 
 
 158.  In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.1994). 
 159.  Cited cases included In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844 (N.Y. Surr. Ct., 1992), and Conkel v. Conkel, 
509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). 
 160.  Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of 
Historical Context, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1994). 
 161.  Id. at 16. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 164.  Id. at 948. 
 165.  Id. at 965 n.30. 
 166.  Id. at 972 (stating, “the State’s refusal to accord legal recognition to unions of same-sex 
couples has had the effect of creating a system in which children of same-sex couples are unable to 
partake of legal protections and social benefits taken for granted by children in families whose 
parents are of the opposite sex. The continued maintenance of this caste-like system is irreconcilable 
with, indeed, totally repugnant to, the State’s strong interest in the welfare of all children and its 
primary focus, in the context of family law where children are concerned, on ‘the best interests of the 
child’ “). 
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question was not whether being raised by homosexual parents is harmful but 
was instead whether being raised by homosexual parents whom the state 
prevents from marrying is harmful.  Thus, the studies relied upon by the In re 
Adoption of Caitlin court to determine whether to permit a second parent 
adoption may be considered influential in deciding whether to allow gay 
marriage. 
The plaintiffs in Goodridge were fourteen people who desired to marry their 
partners “in order to affirm publicly their commitment to each other and to 
secure the legal protections and benefits afforded to married couples and their 
children.”167  They filed suit against the Department of Public Health, which 
oversees the issuance of marriage licenses, claiming that the denial of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples violated Massachusetts law.168  In its discussion, the 
Massachusetts court stated that children are deprived of security and benefits 
from the state because their parents are precluded from marrying; when same-
sex couples are denied the right to marry, their children are denied an equal 
footing with children raised by married heterosexual couples.169 
The court refuted the notion that the State’s interest in marriage meant that 
only the Legislature could dictate what marriage means and who can participate 
in that institution.170  In a supporting footnote, the court asserted that the 
Legislature likely knows of the studies on the issue of same-sex parenting and its 
impact on children “and has drawn the conclusion that a child’s best interest is 
not harmed by being raised and nurtured by same-sex parents.”171  The majority 
dismissed the dissent’s focus on divergence in study results.172  Hence, although 
it is appropriate to defer “to the Legislature to decide social and policy issues . . . 
it is the traditional and settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues.”173  
The Massachusetts court concluded that “constru[ing] civil marriage to mean the 
voluntary union of two persons as spouses . . . advances the two legitimate State 
interests the department has identified: providing a stable setting for child 
rearing and conserving State resources.”174  This ruling reflects the intertwined 
nature of notions about child rearing and marriage.  In fact, one could reasonably 
conclude that favorable conclusions about homosexuals in the legislatures—
thanks to social science studies175—shapes the advancement of rights in the 
 
 167.  Id. at 949. 
 168.  Id. at 949–50. 
 169.  Id. at 963–65. 
 170.  Id. at 966. 
 171.  Id. at 965 n.30. 
 172.  Id. at 966. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 969. 
 175.  The validity of the social science is a point of contention between the majority and dissent.  
Although the majority found these studies persuasive, the dissent stated that “[c]onspicuously absent 
from the court’s opinion today is any acknowledgment that the attempts at scientific study of the 
ramifications of raising children in same-sex couple households are themselves in their infancy and 
have so far produced inconclusive and conflicting results.”  Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).  For the 
dissent, there has not been enough long-term observation of children raised by same-sex couples, so 
even if there is not “bias or political agenda behind the various studies of children raised by same-sex 
couples,” it would be reasonable for the Legislature, “as the creator of the institution of civil 
marriage,” to desire more concrete evidence “before making a fundamental alteration to that 
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judicial context. 
The Goodridge decision is significant in several respects.  First, it condoned 
same-sex marriage, thus picking up where Lawrence left off in its recognition of 
“the central role that decisions whether to marry or have children bear in 
shaping one’s identity.”176  Second, it asserts the validity of studies on the issue 
of same-sex parenting.177  Third, consistent with the increasing prevalence of 
amicus briefs since the Brandeis Brief,178 briefs by amici curiae flooded the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.179  Fourth, on a macro level, the case is 
noteworthy because it explores the huge shift in social science and public 
attitudes since the days when homosexuality was considered a mental illness.  
Thus, Goodridge is the paragon case of social science in the gay rights realm.  
Social science was the linchpin of a case that advanced equality, and that 
decision in turn propelled a movement towards equal rights.  The landscape of 
this area of law is best summarized by the Goodridge dissent: 
The advancement of the rights, privileges, and protections afforded to 
homosexual members of our community in the last three decades has been 
significant, and there is no reason to believe that that evolution will not continue.  
Changes of attitude in the civic, social, and professional communities have been 
even more profound.  Thirty years ago, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 
the seminal handbook of the American Psychiatric Association, still listed 
homosexuality as a mental disorder.  Today, the Massachusetts Psychiatric 
Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, and many other psychiatric, 
 
institution.”  Id. at 980. 
 176.  Id. at 948.  Civil marriage between homosexuals “is a question the United States Supreme 
Court left open as a matter of Federal law in Lawrence, where it was not an issue.”  Id. at 313 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 177.  Yet the disagreement between the majority and dissent regarding the credibility of these 
findings evidences that “[t]he role that social science plays in the same-sex marriage debate is 
currently a contested issue that will likely impact future same-sex marriage cases.” Vanessa A. 
Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and 
Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 280 n.245 (2007) (citing Stephen A. Newman, The Use and Abuse 
of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 537 (2004)). 
 178.  Falk asserts that one of the reasons that there is a high prevalence of social science in gay 
rights cases is that the current legal landscape is one “in which the citation of social science has 
become more routine.”  Falk, supra note 160, at 21. 
 179.  For example, amicus briefs were filed by The Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the 
National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, Inc., and the Catholic Action 
League of Massachusetts.  One scholar has argued that social science is frequently cited by courts 
when faced with gay rights cases because the arguments of the litigants are supplemented by “two 
distinct types of organizational amici: gay and civil rights groups and scientific associations, such as 
the American Psychological Association” supplement the arguments of the litigants.  Falk, supra note 
160, at 21–22.  In other words, because there is more information before the courts, it is more likely 
than not that courts will incorporate that evidence into their opinions.  In Goodridge, both types of 
organizations Falk delineates submitted amicus briefs.  Interestingly, the majority’s references to 
amici were to refute the arguments of amici advocating against gay marriage (“The department 
suggests additional rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying, which are developed 
by some amici.  It argues that broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples will trivialize or 
destroy the institution of marriage as it has historically been fashioned.”  Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965.  
“We also reject the argument suggested by the department, and elaborated by some amici, that 
expanding the institution of civil marriage in Massachusetts to include same-sex couples will lead to 
interstate conflict.”  Id. at 967). 
Rublin_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:40 AM 
200 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:179 2011 
psychological, and social science organizations have joined in an amicus brief on 
behalf of the plaintiffs’ cause.  A body of experience and evidence has provided 
the basis for change, and that body continues to mount.180 
Patricia Falk, nearly a decade prior to the Goodridge decision, posited that 
courts use social science in gay rights cases to accomplish four key goals.  Each of 
these four aims is apparent in the Goodridge opinion.  The first is to inform 
different audiences about homosexuality.181  Through education, a given court’s 
aim is to convince these audiences that decisions reached are valid.182  Second, 
courts employ social science in order to refute ingrained stereotypes or myths 
about homosexuality.183  Third, courts use “the authoritative appeal of ‘science,’ 
in the guise of social science citations, as a means of desensitizing or even 
sanitizing, the troubling moral and political issues associated with 
homosexuality.”184  Fourth, social science is a way to disguise “decisions reached 
on other policy grounds, thereby shifting responsibility for difficult decision 
making.”185 
Goodridge illustrates how these goals are interrelated, not mutually 
exclusive.  By citing social science studies on the issue of homosexuals’ fitness as 
parents, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that homosexuals 
and heterosexuals make equally good parents.  In so doing, the court also 
accomplished its second goal because the studies debunk the idea that children 
raised by same-sex couples are adversely affected.186  As for quelling concerns 
about homosexuality, the court referenced arguments made by amici: “Several 
amici suggest that prohibiting marriage by same-sex couples reflects community 
consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral.”187  To this the court responded: 
“The absence of any reasonable relationship between . . . an absolute 
disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and . . . 
protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage 
restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are 
believed to be) homosexual.”188  In this way, the Massachusetts court pointed to 
the absence of proof as support for its decision to equalize marriage.  As for the 
fourth aim, using social science as a façade for a decision reached on other 
grounds, it is nearly impossible to know—in the absence of personal papers or 
memoirs—whether that is the case in Goodridge.189 
 
 180.  Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 181.  Falk, supra note 160, at 30. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.30 (Mass. 2003). 
 187.  Id. at 948. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that there are “two entirely different modes of 
reaching and justifying legal conclusions: One mode was adopted for purposes of public 
presentation, while the other operated behind the scenes as the real determiner of decisions.”  Steven 
D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1081 (1999).  Hence, a judge may decide based 
on his or her own principles of justice that a certain result should be reached but may cite social 
science in the reasoning for that result.  This may be done to add an objective gloss to an entirely 
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It remains to be seen whether the Goodridge decision and its reasoning will 
influence other courts in the way that Brown and its progeny, handed down from 
the Supreme Court, influenced courts throughout the country.  This is not merely 
a question of superiority of the Supreme Court vis-à-vis state courts but a 
question of whether social science will be treated like precedent similar to Stell’s 
treatment of Brown footnote 11.  Stated differently, will studies on gay 
parenting—which influence other determinations, such as marriage—rise to the 
level of precedent that must or should be followed by other courts, even those in 
other states?  Or will battles over the legitimacy of those studies override efforts 
by homosexual litigants to obtain equal footing with heterosexuals on issues of 
parenting and marriage? 
If a decision must come from the Supreme Court in order to change the 
landscape as Brown did, a question arises about the likelihood that the Court 
would either hear a case on these issues or use language expansive enough to 
touch these issues.  It may be that equal rights are obtained through the states 
and it is better for advocates to focus their efforts on that level.  As the Goodridge 
court stated, quoting from Arizona v. Evans190: “Fundamental to the vigor of our 
Federal System of government is that ‘state courts are absolutely free to interpret 
state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights 
than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.’ “191  It may be that 
until there is a fundamental shift in the public’s attitudes such that there will be 
acceptance of a decision across a large segment of society, the Supreme Court 
will refrain from passing judgment.  As Justice Scalia said in the Eighth 
Amendment case Stanford v. Kentucky,192 the people who should hear arguments 
about teenagers facing the death penalty are members of the American public: “It 
is they, not we, who must be persuaded . . . our job is to identify the ‘evolving 
standards of decency’; to determine, not what they should be, but what they are.  
We have no power under the Eighth Amendment to substitute our belief in the 
scientific evidence for the society’s apparent skepticism.”193 
The case law in the Fourteenth Amendment context illustrates the uses and 
limits of social science in both the willingness of judges to accept it and its 
explanatory power.  The next Part, which explores Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, provides a counterpoint to the use of social science in the two 
aforementioned areas of law.  Unlike the gay rights cases discussed supra (with 
the exception of Lawrence), which are decisions on the state or county levels, the 
Supreme Court decided cases of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Thus, 
acceptance of social science by the Court in this context can assume the stature of 
binding precedent like Brown footnote 11.  Two key questions that come into 
 
subjective stance, or it may be done to add gravity to a personal opinion.  If judges are supposed to be 
objective arbiters, then judges may try to find ways to mitigate the appearance of personal biases as 
driving an opinion.  Therefore, it may be impossible to know whether a judge cites social science 
because he or she truly believes it to be persuasive or whether the citation is instead used to conceal 
the significant role of personal motivations. 
 190.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 191.  Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 192.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 193.  Id. at 378 (quoted in Falk, supra note 160, at 69). 
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sharp focus, particularly in light of the integration and gay rights cases are: first, 
why is social science in the death penalty arena treated differently from its 
treatment in the integration context; and second, what accounts for the Court’s 
inconsistent treatment of social science even within the capital punishment 
realm?   
V. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: “THE AMENDMENT MUST DRAW ITS MEANING FROM THE 
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY THAT MARK THE PROGRESS OF A MATURING 
SOCIETY.”194 
Recently, social science has been used to ascertain the meaning of key terms 
in the Eighth Amendment such as “cruel” and “unusual.”195  Whereas the term 
“cruel” is implicated in cases that consider the deterrent abilities of the death 
penalty, the term “unusual” is involved in cases where a party claims that the 
death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory way.196  In addition to the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
also contemplated the meaning of “excessive” sanctions and whether imposing 
death upon particular classes of defendants amounts to excessive punishment.197  
In endeavoring to ascertain the meaning of each of these words, the Court has 
utilized social science.  Not only have dissenters argued for the 
untrustworthiness of studies relied upon by the majority (like the Goodridge 
dissent198), but they have put forth other empirical findings to bolster their own 
arguments.  In addition to this trend in the judicial opinions, the jurisprudence 
indicates that the Court will not deem a certain class punishable by the death 
penalty unless there is a national consensus.199  In this way, the Court will utilize 
social science to make law, and thus employ legislative facts, but only to the 
extent that the public condones. 
In the realm of deterrence, two cases from the 1970s—Furman v. Georgia 
(decided in 1972)200 and Gregg v. Georgia (decided in 1976)201—demonstrate 
reliance on social science in ascertaining whether the death penalty has a 
deterrent effect.  In Furman, the Court decided whether imposing the death 
penalty under Georgia and Texas statutes amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.202  
According to the statutes at issue, a judge or jury had the discretion to decide 
 
 194.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 195.  The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 196.  MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 315. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
 199.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding that a national consensus developed 
against the execution of the mentally retarded and holding that execution of the mentally retarded is 
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding no national consensus in support of 
the death penalty for juveniles and holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional for those who 
committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen). 
 200.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 201.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 202.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
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whether death or a lighter punishment should be imposed.203  As administered, 
the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional.204 
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, bolstered this holding with 
social science.205  He cited Thorsten Sellin—a leading figure in the field of capital 
punishment who argued that the death penalty is unable to deter murderers—
but pointed out three main flaws with his evidence.206  Problems aside, Justice 
Marshall recognized the validity of Sellin’s findings: “He compares states that 
have similar characteristics and finds that irrespective of their position on capital 
punishment, they have similar murder rates.”207  Marshall continued, citing 
myriad studies in footnotes: “Statistics also show that the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment is no greater in those communities where executions take 
place than in other communities.  In fact, there is some evidence that imposition 
of capital punishment may actually encourage crime, rather than deter it.”208  In 
addition, Marshall considered other studies which demonstrated that police are 
not safer in communities with the death penalty than those without it.209  He also 
found that “a substantial body of data” suggests that the impact of the death 
penalty on homicide rates in prison is negligible.210  In concluding that capital 
punishment cannot be justified on the basis of deterrence, Justice Marshall 
asserted: “Despite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to 
crime in our society.”211 
Although the dissent did not discount the possible validity of these studies, 
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent stressed the disagreement among scholars.  With 
an “empirical stalemate,” 212 the burden shifted to states to prove that the death 
penalty is better than life imprisonment at deterring perpetrators.213  The 
problem with this burden-shifting, according to Burger, is that it precludes 
deciding “an unresolved factual question” and it is just “an illusory solution.”214  
In labeling the question as one of fact, the Chief Justice suggested that it is only a 
 
 203.  “We deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of 
judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be 
imprisoned.  Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, 
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.”  Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 204.  Id. at 239–40. 
 205.  His utilization of social science is recognized by Justice Brennan’s concurrence: “as my 
Brother MARSHALL establishes, the available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not 
conclusively prove, that the threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat of 
imprisonment.”  Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 206.  Id. at 349–50 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 207.  Id. at 350 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Finding Sellin’s findings credible aligned Justice 
Marshall with the United Nations and Great Britain, both of which recognizethe validity of Sellin’s 
statistics.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 351 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 209.  Id. at 351–52 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 210.  Id. at 352 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 211.  Id. at 353 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 212.  Id. at 395 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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matter of time until the one true answer emerges.  Until that time, he asserted, 
legislatures—rather than judges—should take “the opportunity to make a more 
penetrating study of these claims with the familiar and effective tools available to 
them as they are not to us.”215 
In the period after Furman but before Gregg v. Georgia, thirty-five state 
legislatures enacted new capital punishment statutes to address the Furman 
Court’s concerns with standard-less impositions of the death penalty.216  The 
specific question facing the Gregg Court was whether Georgia could impose the 
death penalty on a defendant under its new, post-Furman statute.217  The general 
question was whether capital punishment was “so totally without penological 
justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”218  The Court 
stated that the issue of the death penalty as a deterrent was the focus of 
considerable debate;219 there was no convincing empirical proof to show whether 
or not capital punishment served as a “greater deterrent than lesser penalties.”220  
Although “[t]he value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex 
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures,”221 “the 
infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and 
thus is not unconstitutionally severe.”222  For the Gregg plurality, the presence of 
evidence in favor of deterrence, even if in equipoise with studies to the contrary, 
sufficed to establish the utility of the death penalty and its constitutionality. 
As in Furman, Justice Marshall wrote separately in Gregg; dissenting, he 
once again expressed his stance—based on the studies reviewed in Furman—that 
the notion of deterrence cannot suffice to justify capital punishment.223  Not only 
did Justice Marshall again posit that the evidence relied upon in Furman was 
solid, but he also endeavored to discredit a study at the crux of the Solicitor 
General’s amicus brief.224  That study, conducted by Isaac Ehrlich in the year 
after the Furman decision, was “the first scientific study to suggest that the death 
penalty may have a deterrent effect.”225  In addition to citing the numerous 
studies critiquing Ehrlich’s findings, Justice Marshall found flaws in the 
methodology, the time period studied, and conclusions drawn.226  This dissent 
once again illuminates the role of amicus briefs in judicial opinions.  It also 
demonstrates that critiques of arguments favoring capital punishment can be the 
basis for a finding against constitutionality.  In other words, one may see a 
parallel between Justice Marshall’s dissent and the Goodridge majority in that 
both instances find meaning in the absence of social science proof. 
 
 215.  Id. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 216.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976). 
 217.  Id. at 207. 
 218.  Id. at 183. 
 219.  To illustrate this debate, the Court cited a sample of these studies in a footnote.  See id. at 185 
n.31. 
 220.  Id. at 185 (internal citation omitted). 
 221.  Id. at 186. 
 222.  Id. at 187. 
 223.  Id. at 231–41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 224.  Id. at 234–36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 225.  Id. at 234 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 226.  Id. at 234–36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Rublin_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:40 AM 
 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING  205 
Both Furman and Gregg illustrate the principle set forth in the 1958 Supreme 
Court case Trop v. Dulles: “The Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”227  
The Gregg Court, citing the dissents of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in 
Furman, described that legislatures are the body tasked with responding to the 
public’s values, particularly when penalties are at issue.228  If the judiciary, rather 
than the legislatures, decides a sanction is barred by the Eighth Amendment, it 
precludes the public from demonstrating their preferences through standard 
democratic avenues.229  Hence, “a punishment selected by a democratically 
elected legislature” will be presumed valid unless the penalty specified is 
“cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.”230  Justice 
Marshall’s concurrence in Furman best encapsulates the import of public opinion: 
if the public abhorred a sentence, even if it had a valid legislative rationale and 
was not excessive, that repugnance could invalidate that punishment and 
“equate a modern punishment with those barred since the adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment.”231  Although “[t]here are no prior cases in this Court striking 
down a penalty on this ground . . . the very notion of changing values requires 
that we recognize its existence.”232 
When certain classes of defendants, such as mentally retarded people and 
offenders who were under eighteen years of age when they committed certain 
crimes,233 face the death penalty, the public is faced with a question of whether 
executing these people amounts to an “excessive” sanction.  For example, in 
Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court decided whether executions of mentally 
retarded criminals amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.234  The Court began its opinion by setting forth the rule that 
the surest way to reliably ascertain the moral compass of the populace is to look 
at laws enacted by legislatures across the country.235  In tracing the national 
consensus, the Court discussed the landscape following its decision in Penry v. 
Lynaugh,236 which demonstrated that numerous legislatures banned the 
execution of mentally retarded defendants.237  Even in states where lethal 
punishment was legal, such states rarely carried out executions.238  The laws 
 
 227.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  Trop addresses the revocation of U.S. citizenship as 
punishment, but its lasting impact is on the creation of the Eighth Amendment standard of an 
“evolving standard of decency.”  See id. 
 228.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175–76. 
 229.  Id. at 176. 
 230.  Id. at 175. 
 231.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Three years after Atkins, the Supreme Court employed social science and utilized an analysis 
similar to Atkins in the case of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  The Court held that the 
execution of offenders who were under eighteen years of age when they committed their crimes 
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 234.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 235.  Id. at 312. 
 236.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding that imposing the death penalty on the 
mentally retarded was not unconstitutional). 
 237.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16. 
 238.  Id. 
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prohibiting imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants, taken 
together, amounted to a consensus that “reflects widespread judgment about the 
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between 
mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty.”239  
Because executing mentally retarded criminals would not further either the 
deterrent or retributive purposes of the death penalty and the national consensus 
opposed this punishment for this class of people, the Court held that the 
imposition of death on the mentally retarded defendant by the state of Virginia 
would amount to an excessive sanction.240 
Two elements of the Atkins opinion are worth analyzing–the first is general 
to the Eighth Amendment case law and the second is specific to the case.  First, 
the survey of legislation across the states demonstrates that the Court’s 
jurisprudence may shift with the tides of public opinion.  In this way, the Court 
appears as a reactionary body by making law that is already in place in 
numerous states.  Rather than being proactive, the Court simply ratified the shift 
in legislation.  Notably, this contrasts with the thrust of the jurisprudence in the 
integration cases under the Fourteenth Amendment umbrella.  Whereas here 
public opinion is significant—if not outcome determinative—in the context of 
integration cases, discussions of laws across the country do not play a large 
role—if any role at all—in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The second striking aspect of Atkins is the dearth of social science cited.  
Although social science regarding the blameworthiness of mentally retarded 
defendants weaves throughout the Penry decision,241 no such studies are cited in 
Atkins.242  Further, in contrast to the discussions of studies on the issue of 
deterrence in Furman and Gregg, the mention of deterrence in Atkins lacked any 
footnotes to, or analysis of, studies.  According to James R. Acker, who 
undertook an empirical study of capital punishment decisions spanning 1986 to 
1989, a shift occurred from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, and then 
another shift took place from the early 1980s to  1986–89.243  Whereas in the 
earlier phase “the justices most frequently cited social science evidence to discuss 
the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment (27.2% of social science citations) 
(e.g., Furman v. Georgia 1972; Gregg v. Georgia 1976),” in the cases decided 
between 1986 and 1989, deterrence and incapacitation fell by the wayside “as if 
earlier decisions had established empirical ‘precedent’ that would not be 
reexamined.”244  When Atkins was decided in 2002, the notion of social science 
“precedent,” which was already ingrained in the 1980s, was probably even more 
entrenched.  As such, studies on the issues of mentally retarded defendants and 
deterrence—like the social science in Brown footnote 11—assumed the force of 
binding Supreme Court precedent. 
In the 1986–89 period, racial discrimination in the application of the death 
 
 239.  Id. at 317. 
 240.  Id. at 321. 
 241.  See Penry, 492 U.S. 302. 
 242.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
 243.  James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evidence, and Capital 
Punishment Decisions, 1986–1989, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65, 71 (1983). 
 244.  Id. 
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penalty rose to the forefront of discourse regarding capital punishment.245  Acker 
found that 32.6 percent of citations to social science were focused on this issue.246  
McKleskey, decided in 1987, is the paradigmatic case for using social science to 
illustrate racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty.247  Like the 
aforementioned cases that entailed “social fact issues which made empirical 
evidence directly relevant or even essential to the justices’ case decisions,”248 
McCleskey also evidenced the pertinence of social science to a case in which 
empirical and legal issues were enmeshed.249  Whereas the “cruelty” element of 
the Eighth Amendment implicated discussions of deterrence (Furman)250 and the 
“excessive” element invoked analyses of different classes of offenders (Atkins),251 
the key aspect of the Eighth Amendment in discrimination cases is the word 
“unusual.”252  Interestingly, although the Supreme Court found the statistics 
proffered in McCleskey—showing that murderers of white people are 
disproportionately sentenced to death compared to murderers of black people—
credible, the Court found in favor of the state of Georgia.253 
In McCleskey, the issue before the Court was “whether a complex statistical 
study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing 
determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey’s capital sentence is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”254  McCleskey, a 
black man, was convicted of the murder of a white police officer and was 
sentenced to death.255  In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, McCleskey argued 
that the capital sentencing process in Georgia was conducted in a way that 
discriminated on the basis of race.256  To substantiate this assertion, he presented 
the Baldus study,257 a sophisticated statistical report “that purports to show a 
disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of 
the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant.”258 
Justice Powell’s majority opinion began by stating the principle that when a 
defendant claims a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation, the 
 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 248.  Acker, supra note 243, at 70. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243, 297–301, 306–14, 342–56, 362–68, 394–96, 403–06, 
453–56, 459 (1972). 
 251.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310–12, 320, 349–53 (2002). 
 252.  “The ‘unusual’ prong of the Eighth Amendment has been the focus of arguments that the 
death penalty is invoked with disproportionate frequency on defendants whose victims have been 
white.”  MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 323. 
 253.  Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1388 (1988). 
 254.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1987). 
 255.  Id. at 284–85. 
 256.  Id. at 286. 
 257.  This study was done by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George 
Woodworth.  Id. 
 258.  Id. 
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defendant has the burden of showing that purposeful discrimination exists.259  
Therefore, in this case, McCleskey would have to prove that “decisionmakers in 
his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”260  Instead of demonstrating 
discrimination in his particular case, however, he relied on the Baldus study, 
which would apply “to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was 
white and the defendant is black.”261  Not only would accepting the general 
findings of the study in this context compel a certain outcome without 
consideration of the facts of a specific case,262 but such acceptance could 
undermine the State’s entire criminal justice system, which depends on case-by-
case discretion.263 
In response to arguments that the Baldus study proved that capital 
punishment in Georgia violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court declined to 
find that there was “an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital 
sentencing decisions.”264  The majority disagreed with the assertion that 
McCleskey’s sentence was inconsistent with the sentences imposed in other 
murder cases.  Even though the Baldus study suggested that a discrepancy 
correlated with race, the Court concluded that “disparities in sentencing are an 
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”265  According to the McCleskey 
majority, these discrepancies did not clearly amount to a major system-wide flaw 
that casts doubt on the criminal justice system as a whole.266  Further, the Court 
highlighted the existence of built-in protections for defendants, including 
safeguards intended to mitigate racial bias.267  Therefore, Justice Powell, writing 
for the majority, held that “the Baldus study does not demonstrate a 
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital 
sentencing process.”268 
Moreover, two other factors compelled the outcome against McCleskey in 
this case.  First, if one were to extrapolate from McCleskey’s claim about racial 
bias, “we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.”269  
Further, the concept of discrimination on the basis of race could be extended to 
claims by other minority groups270 or assertions that disparities exist because of 
 
 259.  Id. at 292. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. at 293. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at 297.  Justice Powell states: “Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice 
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has 
been abused.”  Id.  Moreover, the Baldus study could not show that the State of Georgia continued to 
impose the death penalty because of its racial impact: “As legislatures necessarily have wide 
discretion in the choice of criminal laws and penalties, and as there were legitimate reasons for the 
Georgia Legislature to adopt and maintain capital punishment . . . we will not infer a discriminatory 
purpose on the part of the State of Georgia.”  Id. at 298–99 (internal citations omitted). 
 264.  Id. at 309. 
 265.  Id. at 312. 
 266.  Id. At 297. 
 267.  Id. at 313. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Id. at 316. 
 270.  Id. at 319 n.38.  The Court followed this statement with a footnote to studies about the issues 
of racial disparities in terms of prison sentences and how any group could assert discrimination.  
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gender.271  Allowing McCleskey’s claim to prevail would open the door to other 
types of claims, such as those rooted in “statistical disparities that correlate with 
the race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system, such as defense 
attorneys or judges.”272  There would be no limit to the type of claim someone 
could bring if any discernable statistical differences existed. 
The second major element that counseled against finding for McCleskey 
was the notion that legislatures, rather than courts, are in the best position to 
ascertain appropriate punishments for certain crimes.273  Justice Powell cited 
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Furman for the principle that legislatures 
respond to the will of the people and cited Gregg for the idea that legislatures are 
the ideal body to assess the merits of statistical studies and their applicability to 
local conditions.274  Because capital punishment existed in over two-thirds of 
American states and McCleskey’s challenge had broad applicability regarding 
“the validity of capital punishment in our multiracial society,” the Court 
refrained from handing down a rule that would sweep wider than the narrow 
question before it.275 
According to Acker, by rejecting McCleskey’s arguments, the Court 
“effectively foreclose[d] any future federal constitutional challenges to the 
administration of capital punishment based on broad-scale empirical studies that 
reflect arbitrariness or invidious discrimination in the application of death 
penalty statutes.”276  Similarly, Baldus believes that the Court “establish[ed] 
burdens of proof for the use of statistical evidence to establish discrimination in 
death penalty cases that were impossible to meet.”277  These conclusions, in 
conjunction with an analysis of the Court’s reasoning, suggest that the Court 
recognized the public’s approval of the death penalty and feared that deciding in 
favor of this defendant would uproot that system.278  Stated differently, the Court 
 
Thus, McClesky’s claim could open the door to cases about penalties and the groups impacted by 
said penalties.  The Court explained thusly: “the national ‘majority’ ‘is composed of various minority 
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and 
private individuals.’ ” Id. at 319 n.38.  Hence, any person, even one who is white, can make a claim on 
the basis of race.  This is because “[i]ncreasingly whites are becoming a minority in many of the larger 
American cities. . .[and] [t]here appears to be no reason why a white defendant in such a city could 
not make a claim similar to McCleskey’s if racial disparities in sentencing arguably are shown by a 
statistical study.” Id. 
 271.  Id. at 316–17. 
 272.  Id. at 317. 
 273.  Id. at 319. 
 274.  Id.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153,  186 (1976). 
 275.  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.  As David C. Baldus states, this outcome makes sense because 
finding in favor of McCleskey “could threaten the legitimacy of death sentencing in Georgia and 
possibly beyond.  At the very least, such a ruling would complicate its administration.”  David C. 
Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social Science, 70 IND. L.J. 1033, 
1039 (1995). 
 276.  Acker, supra note 243, at 76 n.8. 
 277.  Baldus, supra note 275, at 1040. 
 278.  See GALLUP, Death Penalty (Dec. 27, 2011, 4:45 PM), www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-
penalty.aspx.  In 1987, when the McCleskey decision came down, support for the death penalty was 
well over 70 percent, whereas disapproval for the death penalty was somewhere between 16 percent 
and 17 percent.  As of publication, 61 percent of Americans favor the death penalty and 35 percent 
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seemed to fear that resting its opinion on the Baldus study would permit one 
study—which focused on the race of the victim rather than the race of the 
defendant—to drastically change the Eighth Amendment landscape.279  In this 
way, the majority framed the inquiry in terms of public support for the death 
penalty generally rather than in terms of public support (or lack thereof) for 
disproportionate racial impact in the realm of criminal justice. 
Like in the integration context, the Supreme Court has utilized social science 
as legislative facts to shape Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Similar to Brown 
footnote 11, social science in McCleskey assumed the force of precedent, although 
the former opinion signaled the Court’s receptivity to claims on Equal Protection 
grounds, whereas the latter established a high hurdle for plaintiffs to clear.  In 
both, the resulting rule had far-reaching implications: integration in schooling 
and preservation of the practices in jurisdictions that impose the death penalty.  
Unlike integration cases that employ empirical studies, in capital punishment 
cases the Court insisted on deference to legislatures.  Deference to the legislature 
shifts the responsibility for capital punishment decisions to the states.  By 
passing the buck, it is plain that the Court is more of a reactionary than proactive 
participant in this area of law.  Given the kaleidoscope of decisions discussed 
supra, one may predict how the jurisprudence in the gay rights context will 
evolve.  
 VI. THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
The three areas of law examined above demonstrate that judges, assisted by 
studies brought forth by amici, may consider and be swayed by extrajudicial 
facts. 280  Although some of the aforementioned opinions grappled with social 
science within the text of the opinions and other cases merely cited studies as 
support for specific assertions, the consistent theme is the presence of social 
science.  These cases also demonstrate that empirical findings supporting a 
position are not enough to ensure victory.  The real challenge may arise if the 
opposing party can show a division in findings or can poke enough holes in 
proffered evidence.  Hence, it is not merely the number of studies supporting a 
proposition that matters but also the cohesiveness of their findings and 
 
disapprove of it.  This Gallup poll indicates a decline in support for capital punishment and suggests 
that the shifting tide of public opinion is likely to impact future death penalty cases before the 
Supreme Court.  Id.  See also Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low 
(Oct. 13, 2011), www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-Death-Penalty-Falls-Year-Low.aspx (stating 
that “Sixty-one percent of Americans approve of using the death penalty for persons convicted of 
murder, down from 64 percent last year.  This is the lowest level of support since 1972, the year the 
Supreme Court voided all existing state death penalty laws in Furman v. Georgia”). 
 279.  As David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. state: “The principal 
basis of McCleskey’s discrimination claims was not evidence of discrimination against black 
defendants, but rather against defendants whose victims were white.  This difference constitutes 
another deviation from the typical civil rights model in which the claimants suffered adverse 
treatment or denial of benefits on the basis of their gender or race, factors over which they had no 
control.”  MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 30, at 331. 
 280.  “[A]micus briefs provide the Court with information regarding the number of potentially 
affected parties, these parties’ optimal dispositions, and social scientific, political, and legal 
arguments that often buttress those arguments submitted by the parties to litigation.”  Collins, supra 
note 41, at 810. 
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soundness of their methodology.  Courts sometimes acknowledge the existence 
and potential significance of empirical outcomes but prefer to push 
interpretation upon legislatures on the basis that legislatures allegedly have 
superior tools for comprehending studies.  As Justice Scalia stated in his Roper v. 
Simmons dissent: “Given the nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting 
views, courts—which can only consider the limited evidence on the record before 
them—are ill equipped to determine which view of science is the right one.”281 
A. Defining the Variables 
Judicial opinions are rife with references to public sentiment and laws in 
myriad jurisdictions.  Particularly in the Eighth Amendment context, it appears 
that the Supreme Court considers national opinion, as reflected in state laws 
nationwide, equally as important as social science findings.  Somewhat 
intertwined with the notion of public opinion is the citation by courts to the 
identities and contributions of amici.  As political science professor Paul M. 
Collins, Jr., observes, the Supreme Court has witnessed a marked increase in the 
number of amicus briefs filed and a jump in the number of parties cosigning 
those briefs.282  If a large number of parties cosign a brief in support of one side, 
it “may serve as a crude barometer of public opinion on an issue.”283  Collins 
offers two explanations for why the number of cosigners helps reflect public 
opinion.284  First, because “amicus briefs are aimed at specific cases and issues 
before the Court,” the justices are better able to ascertain public sentiment on a 
certain topic than if they just looked at opinion polls.285  Second, because interest 
groups file amicus briefs, “the number of groups cosigning such briefs may serve 
as a reliable indicator to the justices as to the number of potentially affected 
individuals.”286  Hence, the inextricably intertwined nature of social science, 
amici, and public opinion comes to light when examining the judicial opinions in 
these three areas of law. 
B. Predicting Outcomes 
Although it is nearly impossible to know whether a judge cites social 
science merely to ratify an opinion derived from ideology or external political 
pressure,287 there are two discernable factors that impact case outcomes.  These 
two variables may be labeled “entrenched social science” and “widespread 
 
 281.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 282.  Collins, supra note 41, at 811. 
 283.  Id. at 812. 
 284.  Id. at 813. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Even counting the frequency with which courts cite social science evidence may not be a 
good indicator of persuasiveness.  One commentator explicates: “On the one hand, counting citations 
might over-represent the impact of social science on the Court’s decision making process because 
‘[c]itations may be mere makeweight or post hoc rationalizations for views originating from other, 
unexpressed sources.’  On the other hand, counting citations might under-represent the impact of 
social science on the decision making process because judges may be reluctant to cite certain 
authority even though it influences their reasoning.”  Mody, supra note 85, at 809. 
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movement across jurisdictions.”  Entrenched social science enshrines the notion 
that in some areas of law, studies have been conducted over a long period of 
time and their findings appear settled.  If the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
evidences a discussion of social science and later cases accept those ideas but do 
not cite to studies, their findings may be deemed settled and on par with 
precedent.  An example of this is the evolution in the Court’s discussions of 
deterrence in the Eighth Amendment context or post-Brown treatment of the 
merits of school integration.  A counter-example is in the area of homosexual 
rights, as the dissent in Goodridge stressed.288  Lynn D. Wardle, a law professor 
who has written several articles about the results of studies examining the impact 
of parents’ sexual orientation on their children, labels the social science in this 
area as “very immature, biased, and unreliable.”289  Wardle asserts: “The day will 
come when thorough, serious, longitudinal research will be available . . . . 
Because lesbigay parenting generally and adoption in particular is a rather new 
phenomenon (in significant numbers), one can expect that it will be many years 
before broad-based, reliable, empirical research about lesbigay parenting is 
available.”290  The difficulty of entrenched versus unsettled social science is that 
one judge may see a wide variety of conclusions reached by social scientists as 
evidence of dispute.  Conversely, another judge may perceive uniformity among 
a number of studies within a given area as evidence of settled social science.291  
Hence, the question presented by entrenched social science is whether a court or 
litigant, examining prior case law, would perceive social science in a given area 
as on par with precedent 
C. Why Widespread Movement is More Imperative than Settled Social Science 
Widespread movement across jurisdictions reflects the fact that the 
Supreme Court ascertains trends across the states to determine whether a 
national rule is necessary and what public opinion is on a given issue.  In Brown, 
for example, the Court consolidated cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, 
and Delaware due to their “common legal question.”292  This mix of cases 
demonstrated that the issue of school segregation was not confined to a 
particular region and that a national response was needed.  In the Eighth 
Amendment context, the Court has been explicit about the imperativeness of 
 
 288.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 993–1005 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
 289.  Lynn D. Wardle, Comparative Perspectives on Adoption of Children by Cohabiting, Nonmarital 
Couples and Partners, 63 ARK. L. REV. 31, 8–89 (2010). 
 290.  Id. at 89. 
 291.  For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007), “the Supreme Court addressed challenges to public school programs that sought to enhance 
equal educational opportunity by increasing student racial and ethnic diversity.”  Michael Heise, 
Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and 
Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863 (2008).  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas 
demonstrated that he saw the social science as inclusive because of the “wide array of conclusions 
found in the research literature.”  Id. at 881.  On the other hand, however, Justice Breyer’s dissent “set 
out to leverage the same social science uncertainty in a manner that favored the Seattle School 
District’s decision to use student race in school admissions . . . . Breyer characterized the research 
support for the assertion as ‘well established.’ ”  Id. at 882. 
 292.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954). 
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ascertaining the number of states that have certain laws, such as the prohibition 
on the execution of mentally retarded defendants.  As Kermit Roosevelt III, a 
professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, states: 
The Court usually prefers to wait for clear indications, in state laws or judicial 
decisions, that the national consensus is in place.  In 1967, when it struck down 
state bans on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, only 17 states still had 
them.  In 2003, when it overturned same-sex sodomy bans in Lawrence v. Texas, 
they existed in 13 states.293 
Therefore, it appears that the point at which the Court acknowledges a national 
consensus on an issue (or at which a uniform rule is warranted) is critical. 
Putting these two factors together and assessing the outcomes of the 
aforementioned cases results in the following table, which helps classify the case 
law and make predictions: 
TABLE 1: LIKELIHOOD OF DEVIATION FROM THE STATUS QUO 
 
 Entrenched Social Science Unsettled Social Science 
Widespread Movement 
Across Jurisdictions  
Law Likely to be Changed ? 
Non-Widespread 
Movement 
? Law Unlikely to be 
Changed
 
The table demonstrates that when there is popular sentiment behind a given 
change or law, and the social science on that issue does not evidence conflicting 
principles, the Court will be amenable to shifting the law.  Willingness to modify 
extant law entails treating social science as legislative fact and pronouncing a 
broadly applicable rule.  An example of this box is Atkins where the Court 
perceived a national consensus and treated prior findings on the issue of 
deterrence as binding.294  Another case that could fall into this box is Grutter, in 
which the Court addressed a question of “national importance”: “Whether 
diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race 
in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”295  On the issue of 
social science, the Court stated that numerous expert studies and reports 
demonstrate the “educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.”296  
In both of these cases, the Court’s rulings amounted to pronouncements with 
broad, national applicability. 
On the other hand, however, if a law has only been adopted by a handful of 
legislatures and social science is evolving, it is unlikely the Court will be willing 
to upset the status quo.  For example, in McCleskey the Supreme Court cited the 
 
 293.  Kermit Roosevelt III, Obama’s DOMA shift: Why public embrace of gay marriage–and gays–is now 
certain, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 25, 2011, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0225/Obama-s-DOMA-shift-Why-public-
embrace-of-gay-marriage-and-gays-is-now-certain. 
 294.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 295.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003). 
 296.  Id. at 330. 
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widespread acceptance of capital punishment to show that legislatures, faced 
with statistical analyses, nevertheless consistently supported this form of 
punishment.297  If only a handful of states had death penalty statutes, perhaps the 
Court would have seen acceptance of McCleskey’s arguments as less likely to 
dismantle the entire criminal justice system.  The Baldus study upon which 
McCleskey relied was found to be credible but not totally ironclad or indicative 
of larger trends of empirical proof on the issue of racial differences in capital 
punishment.298  Because the justices perceived the Baldus results as unsettled or 
evolving, the Court was hesitant to base a change in the course of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence on uncertain ground. 
Adoption of children by homosexual couples (and the related topic of gay 
marriage) provides another example of this non-widespread 
movement/unsettled social science mix.  As Judge Cordy’s dissent in Goodridge 
stated, the impact of same-sex marriage on children is an issue that remains 
unresolved by social scientists.299  Although the Massachusetts court was not 
undeterred by the fact that it was the first state to permit gay marriage,300 the 
significant number of states that have not followed Massachusetts would 
certainly be a cause for concern if the subject came before the Supreme Court.  
Currently, only eight jurisdictions have marriage equality.301  According to 
Lambda Legal, there is also a divide amongst jurisdictions on the issue of second-
parent adoption: “About half of all states permit second-parent adoptions by the 
unmarried partner of an existing legal parent, while in a handful of states courts 
have ruled these adoptions not permissible under state laws.”302 
When trying to ascertain the table’s predictive ability in gay rights cases, the 
two blank boxes in the table warrant discussion.  These two blank areas are: 1) 
non-widespread movement/entrenched social science, and 2) widespread 
movement/unsettled social science.  Figuring out what should fill those boxes is 
an especially difficult endeavor, because it depends in large part on the way in 
which the issue is framed and how the evidence is perceived. 
A case about gay rights, for example, may evidence both non-widespread 
movement and unsettled social science.  A majority of states refuse to accept 
either second-parent adoptions or gay marriage.  Further, social science in the 
 
 297.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). 
 298.  “Even assuming the statistical validity of the Baldus study as a whole, the weight to be 
given the results gleaned from this small sample is limited.”  Id. at 295 n.15. 
 299.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) 
(stating, “Given the critical importance of civil marriage as an organizing and stabilizing institution 
of society, it is eminently rational for the Legislature to postpone making fundamental changes to it 
until such time as there is unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus, or both, that such 
changes can safely be made”). 
 300.  CNN, Same-sex couples ready to make history in Massachusetts, CNN, May 17, 2004, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-05-17/justice/mass.gay.marriage_1_lesbian-couples-marriage-law-
federal-constitutional-amendment?_s=PM:LAW. 
 301.  Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html.  
In addition, eight states have arrangements that entail the benefits and responsibilities of marriage 
but are labeled as domestic partnership or civil union.  Id. 
 302.  Adoption and Parenting, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/issues/adoption-
parenting (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
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area of long-term impact of gay parenting on children is sometimes considered 
“very immature, biased, and unreliable.”303  Others have described the research 
on the differences between homosexual and heterosexual parenting as follows: 
The vast majority (if not all) of the research concluded to date which purportedly 
demonstrates “no differences” between homosexual and other parenting (as well 
as their outcomes for children) suffer from significant methodological flaws— 
including the absence of control and comparison groups, study designs that 
preclude reasoned analysis of the proffered “no differences” hypothesis, and 
various errors in sampling (including small sample size and heavy reliance on 
subjective and self-interested reports by study participants).304 
In the instance of non-widespread movement and unsettled social science, the 
table suggests that the Court would be resistant to changing the law. 
But what would happen if the issue were framed as non-widespread 
movement/entrenched social science?  As stated above, non-widespread 
movement could be established by the fact that a small fraction of states condone 
gay marriage.  In addition, some states explicitly refuse to recognize adoption by 
same-sex couples.  Moreover, “in the last several years ballot measures have been 
proposed in sixteen states to prohibit gays and lesbians from adopting 
children.”305 
As for the issue of entrenched social science, as of 2008 social scientists had 
conducted more than fifty studies on the impact of same-sex parenting on 
children.306  Many of these findings indicate that same-sex parenting does not 
negatively affect children.307  As law professor Richard E. Redding describes: 
Indeed, leading professional organizations including the American Psychological 
Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the 
American Academy of Family Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Psychoanalytic Association, and the National Association of Social 
Workers, and most recently, the American Medical Association, regard the 
findings as sufficiently compelling to warrant statements against policies that 
disadvantage lesbians and gays in child custody, adoption, and foster care 
proceedings.308 
From this landscape, a court could find that there is a consensus in the social 
science findings and among experts in the field. 
One could also perceive a gay rights case in terms of widespread 
movement/unsettled social science.  There are many more states that recognize 
various same-sex partnerships than states that permit gay marriage.  
Accordingly, to support the consideration of gay rights as a widespread 
movement, it would be beneficial for the court to consider all varieties of same-
 
 303.  Wardle, supra note 289, at 88–89. 
 304.  Richard G. Wilkins, Trent Christensen & Eric Selden, Adult Sexual Desire and the Best Interests 
of the Child, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 543, 580 (2005). 
 305.  Richard E. Redding, It’s Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the 
Psychology of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 128-29 (2008). 
 306.  Id. at 135. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 136. 
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sex partnerships in its analysis.  In this way, the Court could aggregate the eight 
jurisdictions with marriage equality,309 the eight states that provide the 
responsibilities and benefits of marriage but label that arrangement as either a 
civil union or domestic partnership,310 the five “states that give some or many 
protections with statewide non-marriage laws such as domestic partnership, 
reciprocal beneficiary or other laws,”311 and the five states that provide state 
employees with limited domestic partnership benefits.312  Together, that equals 
twenty-six states.  In addition, it appears that recognition of same-sex 
partnerships in any form is a growing trend, from Massachusetts’s 
groundbreaking recognition of same-sex marriage in Goodridge313 to Illinois’s 
Civil Union Law, which became effective June 1, 2011.314 
i. Widespread Movement 
According to Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Atkins, “[i]t is not so much 
the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction 
of change.”315  Justice Stevens also, in a footnote, cited the amicus curiae briefs 
that show organizational and religious opposition to the execution of mentally 
retarded offenders and polling data of Americans in order to show the “broader 
social and professional consensus” against the practice.316  If the fact that “close 
to twenty states had enacted legislation exempting the mentally retarded from 
the death penalty while maintaining it as a legitimate form of punishment”317 
was indicative of a national consensus, then the recognition by twenty-six states 
of same-sex partnerships would surely indicate a national—or at least growing—
consensus.  Furthermore, in line with Justice Stevens’ reasoning, national opinion 
polls about gay rights are instructive.  According to the Pew Research Center, in 
two studies that polled over 6,000 adults in 2010, 42 percent of Americans 
favored same-sex marriage and 48 percent of Americans opposed it.318  Notably, 
this 2010 finding marked the first time in the fifteen years of polling by the Pew 
Research Center that less than half of Americans disfavored same-sex 
 
 309.  These eight jurisdictions include California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont.  For California, it is worth noting that the 
“estimated 18,000 same-sex couples who married in 2008 remain married but marriage [is] limited to 
different-sex couples after November 5, 2008 by Proposition 8.”  Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex 
Relationships Nationwide, supra note 301. 
 310.  These eight states include California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and Washington.  Id. 
 311.  These five states include Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 312.  This list does not include states listed above that give broader protections.  These five states 
include Alaska, Arizona, Montana, Rhode Island, and New Mexico.  Id. 
 313.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 314.  Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, supra note 301. 
 315.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002). 
 316.  Id. at 316 n.21. 
 317.  Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?  The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the 
Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 494 n.230 (2007). 
 318. 42%–More Americans Supporting Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE 
PRESS,  http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1202 (last visited Dec. 26, 
2011). 
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marriage.319  “It was also a jump in support from 2009, when 37% favored 
allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally.  The rising support for gay marriage 
is broad-based, occurring across many demographic, political and religious 
groups.”320 
The criterion of widespread movement is met by amalgamating two 
elements: 1) analogizing the gay rights scenario and the reasoning undergirding 
Atkins on the issue of a national consensus, and 2) including other permutations 
besides marriage.  Regarding unsettled social science, scholars point to numerous 
flaws with the studies purporting to show that children raised by homosexual 
parents show no adverse consequences resulting from that parenting.321  In 
addition to Professor Lynn Wardle, “the best-known and most prolific legal 
scholar opposing lesbigay marriage and parenting rights,”322 numerous others 
have argued that “the specific effect of homosexual parenting on child 
development remains an open question.”323  Commentators argue there is bias in 
terms of subject selection because studies “generally report on a small group of 
research subjects which are not randomly selected and which do not constitute a 
scientifically representative sample of homosexual parents and their children.”324  
They also cite flaws in methodology, as “studies have failed to incorporate 
theoretically appropriate comparison groups and/or have failed to include the 
necessary, adequate control group of homosexual parenting for statistical 
comparison, which could give comparative meaning to the findings of the 
studies.”325  According to eight published articles about variations in parenting, 
methodological shortcomings render studies finding “no differences” 
undependable.326  Overall, social science remains unsettled on the issue of 
parenting, a matter closely related to gay marriage.327 
What predictions can be made about the two uncertain boxes of non-
widespread movement/entrenched social science and widespread 
movement/unsettled social science, particularly as applied to the gay rights 
context?  The Supreme Court, without perceiving a widespread movement, will 
refrain from passing judgment and handing down a broadly applicable rule on 
the issue of gay rights generally and gay marriage specifically.  Thus, the 
widespread movement/unsettled social science mix is the one more likely to 
 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  See Wardle, supra note 289. 
 322.  Redding, supra note 305, at 160. 
 323.  George Rekers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of Homosexual Parenting: A Critical Review, 14 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 343, 382 (2002). 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. at 347.  See generally George A. Rekers, An Empirically-Supported Rational Basis for 
Prohibiting Adoption, Foster Parenting, and Contested Child Custody by any Person Residing in a Household 
that Includes a Homosexually-Behaving Member, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 325 (2005) (arguing that the 
social science cited to support the idea that there are no differences between parenting by 
heterosexuals and homosexuals is flawed in myriad ways). 
 326.  Redding, supra note 305, at 138. 
 327.  The Goodridge court focused on the intertwined nature of parenting and marriage.  In 
addition, if a couple who had children together wanted to get married, that marriage would certainly 
impact family dynamics.  William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and 
America’s Children, 15 FUTURE CHILD. 97, 107 (2005). 
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result in a change in the law.328  There are two reasons why justices will follow 
public opinion or at least take it into account.  First, justices fear the potential 
override, alteration, or lack of enforcement of their decision by the other 
branches of government.329  Sometimes Congress will respond to a Supreme 
Court opinion with legislation directly attacking the opinion and changing its 
potential enforcement.330  Recently, both Congress and the executive branch 
spoke publicly about their consideration of action to counteract the 2010 
Supreme Court opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.331  As 
Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson state: “while the Court is certainly not 
electorally accountable, those responsible for putting its rulings into effect 
frequently are.  For that reason, strategic justices must gauge the prevailing 
winds that drive reelection-minded politicians and make decisions 
accordingly.”332  In light of the potential ramifications from other branches of 
government, justices will carefully contemplate the national mood 
The second reason why justices value public opinion is institutional 
legitimacy.333  Because the Court has “neither the purse nor the sword, the 
justices must rely on the goodwill of the citizenry to follow its decisions . . . . 
Should the justices ignore the views of the public, it is likely that the Court will 
lose some of its institutional legitimacy and support.”334  If the Court diverges 
too far from public opinion, the populace may not respect and follow its 
decisions.  Hence, “[t]he Supreme Court can increase public acceptance of 
otherwise unpopular rulings, but in doing so the Court threatens its own 
institutional foundation.”335  On the other hand, “[t]he Court’s institutional 
standing may enhance the legitimacy of specific rulings.”336  Thus, credibility of 
an institution, such as the Court, and policy legitimacy (or policy effectiveness) 
are intertwined and perhaps mutually reinforcing.337 
As integration and death penalty cases show, public opinion and the 
perceived necessity of a nation-wide rule are crucial elements in Supreme Court 
 
 328.  Although unsettled social science may cut against likelihood of changes in the law, the 
significance of widespread movement outweighs any countervailing force exerted by unsettled social 
science. 
 329.  Collins, supra note 41, at 812. 
 330.  See, for example, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536(1997), in which the Supreme Court 
found that a Congressional statute—enacted in response to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990)—exceeded the scope of Congress’ powers. 
 331.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010); THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
Constitutional Amendment Considered in Response to Supreme Court Decision on Campaign Finance, Jan. 22, 
2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/21/constitutional-
amendment_n_431760.html (last visited March 2, 2011); THE HUFFINGTON POST, Supreme Court Rolls 
Back Campaign Finance Restrictions, March 23, 2010, available at  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/01/21/supreme-court-rolls-back_n_431227.html (last visited March 2, 2011). 
 332.  Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on 
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019 (2004). 
 333.  Collins, supra note 41, at 813. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.  Jeffrey Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 AM. POL. 
Q. 457, 458 (1992). 
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id. at 457–77. 
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jurisprudence.338  In the landmark gay rights case, Lawrence, the Court stressed 
changes throughout history and the decreasing number of states that enforce 
their laws against homosexual activity.339  Thus, whether in the Fourteenth or 
Eighth Amendment context, there is no mistaking the consideration of national 
trends reflecting popular opinion.  It makes sense for the Court to grant certiorari 
and pass judgment on cases of nationwide import, given that the Court can only 
hear a fraction of the cases in which litigants petition for certiorari.340  Moreover, 
by siding with the wave of legislation granting rights, the Court need not value 
certain forces more highly than others.  As Justice Frankfurter explicated in 
Gregg: “History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized 
when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary 
responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social 
pressures.”341  It is logical for the court to defer to the public at large and look for 
widespread movement to stay above fads.342  If the Court so desired, when faced 
with a gay rights case, it could follow Justice Stevens’ reasoning in Atkins and 
easily find a growing national consensus in favor of gay rights based on national 
polling data and the number of states that recognize same-sex partnerships.343 
ii. Unsettled Social Science 
There is no mistaking the significance of public opinion, but what about the 
other half of the matrix—unsettled social science?  It is more important for gay 
rights cases to demonstrate widespread movement than settled social science for 
two key reasons: 1) considerations of precedent, and 2) concerns about social 
science validity.  Cases presenting constitutional issues “tend to elicit greater 
citation of secondary authorities in general than do nonconstitutional cases,” and 
justices accordingly “appear to make heightened use of social science evidence 
when addressing constitutional issues.”344  As demonstrated supra in the 
discussions of Brown footnote 11 and deterrence in the capital punishment area, 
citations to social science can amount to precedent and thereby bind future 
decisions.345  Because studies can be invalidated by further inquiry,346 the Court 
 
 338.  See supra Parts III, V. 
 339.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
 340.  “Each year, the Court accepts between 100 and 150 of the some 7,000 cases it is asked to hear 
for argument.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Understanding Federal and State Courts, U.S. 
COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/EducationalResources/FederalCourtBasics/CourtStructure/Understandi
ngFederalAndStateCourts.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2011). 
 341.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment) 
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)). 
 342.  Fads differ from widespread movement: while fads are simply everyday fluctuations, 
widespread movement consists of the thrust of opinion in a given direction. 
 343.   See supra text accompanying notes 309–14; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 344.  James R. Acker, Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases, 12 L. & POL’Y 1, 
5 (1990). 
 345.  “Courts treat prior decisions on the probative value of social science evidence as if they were 
decisions on questions of law, with the force of precedent. They do so, however, without enunciating 
what aspect of social science evidence is to be treated like law, and without providing a rationale for 
such treatment.”  Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal 
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 887, 885 (1988). 
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should avoid relying too heavily on social science due to the likely impact of 
such decisions on future cases in myriad areas of law.  In other words, uncertain 
social science may push the Court away from using social science as legislative 
facts.  Basing a decision—particularly one with a broad reach—on social science 
findings later revealed to be inaccurate would undermine the Court’s legitimacy. 
Dozens of amicus briefs, many of which would proffer empirical findings 
for the Court’s consideration, would likely accompany a case on gay rights.347  
But as discussed at length above, the unsettled nature of the social science would 
quickly come to light through the amicus briefs on both sides of the issue.  The 
Court could easily harp on the division among the findings, as the Goodridge 
dissent did, and that discord—exacerbated by a fear of depending on potentially 
unfounded studies—plus the malleability of statistical evidence348 could deter 
the justices from rendering a decision to change the law. 
The widespread movement/unsettled social science mix is more likely the 
combination that will result in a change in the law in the gay rights realm.  In this 
area, a growing national consensus is likely to be more persuasive to the Court 
than social science findings.  This is particularly so given the controversy 
surrounding the validity of such results and the Court’s receptivity to public 
opinion, as shown in preexisting case law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Through the examination of integration, gay rights, and capital punishment 
cases, one sees the import of public opinion and social science, the role of amici 
in presenting courts with extrajudicial evidence, and the way in which courts 
frame an issue to craft either a broad rule or tailor their holding to the parties at 
hand.  Whereas some cases expose judges grappling with the methodology and 
findings of studies in the body of an opinion, other cases illustrate how citations 
of studies in footnotes lend weight to a given assertion.  As the case law shows, 
social science may be employed to accomplish myriad goals—by judges to 
support a given line of reasoning or decision and by litigants and amici to lend 
credibility to their arguments and cast doubt on their opponents’ arguments.  
Social science can also reveal that extant rules are antiquated and inapplicable to 
present-day social realities.  For example, social science in Brown footnote 11 
 
 346.  Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. 
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 347.  Given that thirty-three amicus briefs were filed in Lawrence v. Texas, one may reasonably 
assume that the import of an issue like gay marriage and the increasing prevalence of amicus briefs 
would certainly result in a deluge of such briefs.  Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?: Supreme Court Law 
Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 33–34 (2004) (citing the number of amicus 
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 348.  As Richard E. Redding and N. Dickon Reppucci argue, “The legal profession tends to be 
somewhat skeptical about the validity, reliability, or relevance of social science and statistical 
evidence, finding it to be infinitely malleable and susceptible to varying interpretations.”  Richard E. 
Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social 
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demonstrated that present understandings conflicted with the entrenched 
principles underlying segregated schooling.  On a more micro level, citation to 
social science can help decide a dispute between two discrete litigants, such as 
whether a second parent adoption is appropriate in a given case. 
Judicial opinions show that it is immaterial whether a given party is on the 
plaintiff or defense side because both parties seek justification in social science 
for the rule they hope a court will adopt.  Parties and amici amass social science 
evidence both to bolster their own position and to undercut the other side’s 
argument.  As the discussion supra shows, courts often reference the amicus 
briefs that presented influential studies to the court.  Similarly, writers for both 
the majority and dissent incorporate social science to evidence a basis for their 
decisions to the parties before them, to the broader public, and to other courts 
that may cite the instant case as precedent.  The aforementioned decisions 
demonstrate that sometimes judges analyze social science proffered by one party 
only to cast doubt on its methodology or findings.  Judges need not acknowledge 
or confront the social science upon which parties or other judges rely, but they 
may choose to do so to demonstrate its shortcomings. 
When used as legislative facts, social science can become binding.  This 
social science precedent can have damaging implications for the future of case 
law or perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy if the studies are found to be 
without merit.  The potential for reversing seemingly settled studies is acute, 
given that the evidence and social science findings are variously settled, 
challenged, disputed, revised, and rejected.  Like natural science, social science 
“shares the positive attribute of objective understanding derived through 
controlled systematic inquiry, and it shares the limitation that all sciences suffer, 
given the great complexity of their respective subjects.”349  Understandings 
derived from social science can evolve based on refined methodologies or new 
findings.350  As one commentator observes: 
No matter how advanced social science should become, or how successfully it 
identifies the general laws of human behavior, substantial uncertainty will 
always remain a feature of the scientific enterprise.  The creation of grand 
theories with broad predictive power has proved to be difficult even in physics, 
where control of variables generally is less difficult than in the social sciences 
and the variables of interest have been studied for a longer time.351 
 
That social science may evolve is not a reason to disfavor its use by the judiciary 
but a reason to pause and assess its credibility before incorporation into a judicial 
opinion. 
This Article presents implications for people who wish to effectuate top-
down change through Supreme Court rule-making.  In light of the importance of 
public opinion in judicial decision making, advocates for a given cause should 
work toward pushing legislation on the state level in a certain direction.  That 
 
 349.  Faigman, supra note 2, at 1025. 
 350.  Faigman states: “One consequence of the law’s reliance on scientists for knowledge of social 
facts is that the law might fluctuate with every new data set or, alternatively, change too slowly while 
waiting for new data to be collected.”  Id. at 1040. 
 351.  Id. at 1044. 
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way, through amicus briefs, the Court may see the national mood on a specific 
issue.  In areas of social science that are less settled, such as same-sex parenting, 
researchers should endeavor to address some of the criticism of the studies 
completed thus far.  It will be easier to counter these critiques as more time 
transpires since the first permissible same-sex parent adoptions.  With an 
increased acceptance of adoption by same-sex parents and the passage of time, it 
will be easier for researchers to demonstrate whether children raised by 
homosexual couples are disadvantaged.  Amici should consider pursuing 
opportunities for cosigning to prove to courts, and the Supreme Court in 
particular, the number and type of parties interested in a certain decision.  A 
coalition, like the religious organizations that joined together in Atkins, signifies 
broad support for a certain outcome. 
This Article, by examining three areas of law—integration, capital 
punishment, and gay rights—that have not been analyzed together before, opens 
up numerous other research questions.  One potential avenue is an empirically-
focused examination of the frequency with which courts reject social science as 
unsettled and also cite public opinion trends in the same opinion.  Such a study 
would provide quantitative support for the qualitative assertions made here.  It 
would also be useful to see if the trends discussed here also apply to case law 
under the First and Sixth Amendment umbrellas.  Another interesting avenue of 
research is the exploration of how different state supreme courts respond to 
developments in other states on the issue of gay marriage or same-sex parenting.  
In this way, one could see, on a state-by-state level, the direction of these 
opinions.  This would allow advocates to see where courts are more swayed by 
what is happening in other states and allow advocates to tailor their advocacy 
accordingly.  In addition, such a state-by-state study would help the Supreme 
Court see—beyond the strict numbers of how many states allow gay marriage—
whether a nation-wide rule is imperative. 
Since the Brandeis Brief, courts have increasingly considered and 
incorporated social science into their opinions.  From two very different areas in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and Eighth Amendment case law, one 
clearly sees the influence of social science.  Social science can discern the 
existence of a national consensus and whether the Supreme Court is likely to 
respond to such a national consensus.  Although the jurisprudence in these 
realms—particularly gay rights and capital punishment—is still in flux, there is 
little doubt that social science will continue to influence their evolution. 
 
